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Large-scale litigation, such as the Vioxx, Zyprexa, and asbestos cases,
breeds conflict. Conflicts arise between attorneys and their clients (agency
problems), plaintiffs and other plaintiffs (group problems), and plaintiffs'
attorneys and other plaintifs' attorneys (competition problems). Although
judges regularly refuse to certify these cases as class actions, they still pro-
ceed en masse to achieve economies of scale and present a credible threat
to defendants. Assuming that coordinating and consolidating large-scale
litigation is systemically desirable, this Article explores a new approach to
removing the group and agency problems that increase aggregate litiga-
tion's costs and undermine its normative goals such as fairness, compensa-
tion, and deterrence.
Unlike traditional scholarship that emphasizes individual autonomy or
welfare maximization, this Article borrows from the literature of moral and
political philosophy as well as social psychology to analyze group dynam-
ics within nonclass aggregation. It requires us to view plaintifs within
large-scale litigation as a community of sorts and to recognize that some-
times a litigant incurs obligations simply by virtue of being a group mem-
ber, whether chosen or not and whether welfare-maximizing or not. More-
over, empirical studies demonstrate that once people consider themselves
part of a group, they exhibit other-regarding preferences-trust, reciproc-
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. For invaluable comments on
earlier drafts and/or thought-provoking discussions, I am indebted to Curtis Bridgeman, Thomas
Burch, Robin Craig, Brannon Denning, Sam Issacharoff, David Marcus, Dan Markel, Richard Na-
gareda, J.B. Ruhl, Tony Sebok, Peggy Torrey, Lesley Wexler, Manuel Utset, Ben Zipursky, and
participants at Law and Society's Access to Justice Panel and Vanderbilt University School of Law's
Roundtable on Mass Settlements via Contract with Plaintiffs' Law Firms. Special thanks to Al Penning-
ton and numerous members of the Merck Settlement Group for their willingness to correspond with me
and for their thoughtful insights about the Vioxx settlement.
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ity, and altruism-toward other members. Cohesive group members are
more likely to cooperate with one another and care about the collective
outcome, and less likely to exit the group when doing so benefits the indi-
vidual rather than the group. In the face of hard cases, of instability and
disunity, plaintiffs who have made promises and assurances to one another
can invoke social norms of promise-keeping, social agglomeration, com-
patibility, and the desire for means-end coherence to achieve consensus,
mitigate client-client conflicts, and restore the tether between clients and
their attorneys. Thus, using groups to overcome the problems in nonclass
aggregation not only makes sense from a group responsibility perspective,
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INTRODUCTION
Group dynamics fundamentally change mass litigation. But few, if any,
attempts have been made to harness the power of groups for the good of
the litigants. The reason, in part, is that scholars tend to approach the judi-
cial handling of large-scale litigation-class actions, mass torts, non-
class aggregation-and the problems it engenders based on one of two
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perspectives. One camp includes those who want to use aggregation proce-
dures to regulate conduct efficiently and deter wrongdoing in order to
maximize social welfare; the other privileges individual autonomy and con-
sent over the general welfare, aiming to afford individual justice to victims
through their own day in court.' Nearly all theoretical scholarship on large-
scale litigation invokes one or both of these two principles-welfare maxi-
mization or individual autonomy. Relying principally on these two perspec-
tives, however, leads us to many of the same arguments. Not surprisingly
then, perennial problems-imperfect agency, conflicts of interest, holdouts,
and settlement misallocation-persist today. This Article seeks a new route,
one that may meld or disrupt these existing factions on different points, but
ushers in a new way of thinking about the plaintiffs within large-scale liti-
gation by focusing on group dynamics.
An alternative emphasis on groups, one that borrows from moral and
political philosophy as well as cognitive social psychology, can change the
terms of this debate and mitigate aggregation's age-old dilemmas. But it
requires us to view plaintiffs within large-scale litigation as a community of
sorts and to recognize that sometimes obligations follow simply by virtue
of being a group member, whether chosen or not.
To explain, until a few decades ago, political philosophy divided along
roughly the same lines as class action scholarship. Utilitarians such as Jer-
emy Bentham and John Stuart Mill promoted welfare maximization,
1. For examples of those who tend to emphasize individual autonomy, see Richard A. Epstein,
The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1
(1990); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations
of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass
Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (1989). Echoes of autonomy exist in Supreme Court
opinions as well. E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (discussing the idea of one's own day in court), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 811-12 (1985) (discussing class members' rights to notice and opt out).
For examples of those adopting a collective or efficiency-based approach, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why
Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996) [hereinafter Individual Justice]; David Rosenberg, Of End Games and
Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989).
Still others have recommendations for mitigating between these two camps to protect both individual
and group interests. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemalang Process, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule
23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1821 (1995); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
918 (1995); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
Many of these demarcations come from David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914-16 nn.3-4 (1998).
32009]
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pronouncing, "justice . . . is whatever utility requires." 2 Other theorists
dating back to the classical social-contract model, such as Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, tended toward autonomy, pressing for some notion of indi-
vidual consent to bind people through a social contract theory of political
obligation.3 John Rawls then built on these ideas to construct a political
philosophy based on individual autonomy.
But after John Rawls-and in some ways because of Rawls-things be-
gan to change. A third lens for political philosophy emerged. Michael San-
del famously argued that we have obligations simply by virtue of being
members of a community, regardless of whether we consented to being
part of that community or whether recognizing those obligations maxi-
mized welfare.' In addition to Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer,
and Alasdair MacIntyre emphasized human association as a source of self-
identity and the building block of society.' By now, political philosophers
have developed a sophisticated literature on what constitutes a political
community, the qualifications for community membership, and the moral
consequences that flow from such membership.
Bringing this literature to bear on mass litigation suggests an unconven-
tional source of litigant obligations apart from privileging autonomy or
maximizing welfare. The alternative is based instead on inclusion within
the relevant community. Once we consider what constitutes a community
within large-scale litigation, social psychology offers a growing empirical
literature on group norms, collective decision-making, and cooperation.
When people conceive of themselves as group members, they demonstrate
other-regarding preferences. They tend to change their views of distribu-
tive and procedural justice such that they are no longer principally con-
cerned with their own outcome, but with equity for the collective group.
Group membership fundamentally changes the litigation calculus in benefi-
cial ways-litigants feel obligated to one another. To capitalize on those
other-regarding preferences, social psychology also recommends tech-
niques to foster group formation and increase cohesion and stability.
To make concrete these abstract ideas, consider two familiar examples.
The first is a family. Simply by virtue of being related, many would
2. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 5 n. 1 (1982). Mill states this
proposition less succinctly. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 59 (George Sher, 2d ed., Hackett
Publishing Co., Inc. 2001) (1861) ("While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an
imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility
to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality.").
3. Although Hobbes and Rousseau are not universally regarded as autonomists in the Kantian
sense, I categorize them as autonomy theorists since the point of the social contract is that it bases
political obligation on some notion of individual consent.
4. SANDEL, supra note 2, at 1-14.
5. ADRIAN LITTLE, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY 19 (2002). Although these scholars have be-
come known as "communitarians," most eschew that label. Sandel, in particular, seems to see himself
as reviving civic republicanism.
4 [Vol. 61:1}:1
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agree that we have obligations to our parents even though we had no part
in selecting them. The second example comes from tort law. Generally, we
have no duty to rescue one another. But, if you are in the middle of a mul-
ticar pileup (through no fault of your own), and you inadvertently put
someone else in peril, then you have an obligation to help her.' You have
not consented to being a son or daughter or part of a car accident in any
meaningful way; nevertheless, you incur certain obligations simply by be-
ing part of that "community."' To be sure, claiming that communities give
rise to obligations says nothing about the nature of those obligations. A
duty to rescue in tort law might simply require you to call for help, not to
endanger your own life in a heroic rescue. But the point for now is that
mere membership in a group, whether chosen or not and whether welfare-
enhancing or not, can sometimes give rise to obligations.'
This Article has two objectives. First, I argue that scholars, judges,
and practitioners who are either thinking about or engaged in large-scale
litigation-be it class actions, mass torts, or other nonclass aggregation-
should seriously consider this alternative source of obligation. Although I
focus here on nonclass aggregation, the general insights about community,
commitments, and groups apply to other forms of aggregation as well.
Aggregation involves cases where many people are injured in comparable
ways by the same product, drug, or chemical; the same defendant; or who
share some other common denominator. Thus, plaintiffs can be loosely
construed as a community, not just a collection of individuals. To use a
term first coined by Margaret Gilbert, these individuals constitute a "plural
subject."' Characterizing litigants in this way forces us to contemplate the
possibility that the content of their rights and duties may not depend only
on what maximizes the general welfare or what preserves their individual
autonomy, but what follows from their membership in that group.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1, 2004)
("For example, an automobile driver who collides with another (negligently or non-negligently) has a
duty to use reasonable care to prevent further harm to the other."); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv. 1625, 1709-10 (2002); John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
657, 747 (2001); cf. Fuentes v. Reilly, 590 F.2d 509, 513 (3d Cir. 1979); Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck
Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802, 808-09 (Cal. 1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965) ("If
the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tortious or innocent, he has caused
such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and in danger of further harm, the actor is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent such further harm."). I am indebted to Curtis Bridgemen for
suggesting this example.
7. I use the terms "community" and "group" in their colloquial sense and often use them inter-
changeably. To be sure, a community would technically be one type of group, and groups themselves
may form within plural communities.
8. Granted, utilitarians might fairly claim that these duties are justified because they maximize
welfare. My objective here, however, is to say simply that a moral duty arises from the fact of mem-
bership in a community, regardless of whether that duty also happens to increase welfare.
9. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2000); see also Shapiro, supra note
1, passim (reasoning that a class action is more than an aggregation of its individual members).
2009] 5
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Still, even if I am right about this broad idea, two daunting questions
remain: What constitutes a litigation community, and what obligations flow
from membership in that community? The most I can do in this regard is
hint at some answers by drawing from the literature of philosophy and so-
cial psychology. Unsurprisingly, there are many types of communities and
the nature and obligations depend heavily on the community itself.
My second objective is to demonstrate more concretely how group-
based obligations and empirical studies on groups should inform the way
we approach nonclass aggregation. Nonclass aggregation means mass join-
der actions-such as the Vioxx, Zyprexa, and asbestos cases-that encom-
pass claims held by multiple plaintiffs who each have a contractual rela-
tionship with their attorney. These claims cannot be certified as a class
action either because individual issues predominate or a class action would
be unmanageable.o Even though the nature of personal injury and product
liability claims might compel litigants to initiate these claims individually,
because the costs of effectively developing and litigating such claims is so
high, aggregation helps effectuate substantive goals and creates a credible
threat to defendants.
Three related notions underlie this second objective. First, I rely on the
literature from moral and political philosophy to define and explain how
litigants within nonclass aggregation form a community and to suggest the
obligations that flow from that community. Second, empirical findings
from social psychology demonstrate that once people perceive one another
as group members, they tend to fundamentally change their ideas aboutjustice: they care not just about their own outcomes but about the group's
collective welfare. They are more likely to cooperate and less likely to
defect. Thus, moving beyond a reductionist theory-the idea that a group is
simply an aggregate of individuals-and making a serious inquiry into
"groups" provides clues about alleviating aggregation's quintessential di-
lemmas of attorney-client conflicts, client-client conflicts, allocation prob-
lems, the lack of voice opportunities, and even the so-called "holdout prob-
lem." Third, social psychology also suggests methods for fostering group
cohesion. Put differently, after recognizing that group members incur
moral obligations to one another and that membership both increases coop-
eration and changes decision-making about dilemmas, we should explore
how the legal system can encourage those prosocial behaviors.
To accomplish these two objectives, this Article is divided into three
parts and rests on several assumptions." Throughout this Article, I take
10. For a detailed definition of nonclass aggregation, see infra pp. 9-12.
11. These assumptions build on my previous scholarship in this area and permit me to develop a
framework for this new approach. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass
Aggregation, 44 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Burch, Procedural Justice]; L. Elizabeth
6 [Vol. 6 1:1: 1
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for granted a prototypical aggregate lawsuit: many plaintiffs (who may be
geographically dispersed) bring tort claims with sometimes difficult causa-
tion issues against a large corporate defendant and request damages and
possibly other relief. Changes in this base assumption, such as territorial
proximity, make group formation and cohesion simpler. I further assume
that a settlement offer is fair, though that assumption and its definition are
heavily disputed in real-world cases. Finally, this Article brackets, for
now, first-order questions about the nature and purpose of the tort system
and assumes a pluralist perspective.
Part I explains the occurrence and prevalence of nonclass aggregation
and highlights the conflicts that process engenders. Conflicts surface be-
tween attorneys and their clients and between plaintiffs and other plaintiffs
over when and how to settle, litigation goals, and how to allocate the set-
tlement proceeds. The defendant's desire for complete peace exacerbates
the holdout problem, where some plaintiffs demand premiums for their
consent and thus threaten to derail the settlement. Disunity emerges as the
common thread; promoting harmony and cooperation-unity in other
words-mitigates the discord. Plus, a unified group is in a better position
to perform the oversight functions that protect clients in traditional bipolar
litigation, such as monitoring the litigation's progress and holding the at-
torney accountable.
Part II lays the theoretical foundation for the proposed alternative: a
novel claimant-centered approach founded on groups and social norms.
Accordingly, Part II undertakes the task of defining and explaining how
aggregate litigants can be considered a community. Using illustrations from
Agent Orange, Vioxx, the Buffalo Creek Disaster, and the Holocaust liti-
gation, this section introduces the "plural subject" concept as an umbrella
term and develops its stronger subsets-shared cooperative activity and
shared group policies. It then questions whether large-scale litigation, such
as Vioxx, could constitute a singular group. It concludes that the possibility
exists, but that relying on superficial unifying features as the social glue
may prove too thin to endure in the face of hard cases. Dispersion due to
instability and shallow cohesion may cause splintering and subgrouping.
Part III builds on this theory of groups within nonclass aggregation to
mitigate some of the problems raised in Part I, including holdouts, group
outliers, and subgroup competition. First, it posits that obligations follow
from being a plural subject and evaluates when members are morally obli-
gated to one another not to opt out of the litigation. When litigants jointly
and voluntarily intend to perform all or some litigation tasks together and
Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-
Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REv. 157, 160 (2004).
72009] Litigating Groups
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commit to doing so through promises and assurances, they are morally
obligated to act in accordance with those intentions.12 Thus, it is the prom-
ises and assurances-the commitment-made in the execution and etiology
of group development that obligates. This Subpart does not take a position
on how substantive law should enforce those moral obligations; instead, the
second Subpart of Part III suggests methods for cultivating group cohesion
in mass litigation through cooperation. Cooperation challenges the pur-
ported need for externally coercive mechanisms to obligate and restrain
litigants. That is, once we recognize that plural subjects incur moral obli-
gations to one another and that membership both increases cooperation and
changes decision-making about dilemmas, systemically encouraging those
prosocial behaviors helps alleviate problems caused by outliers and hold-
outs. Finally, the last Subpart proposes methods for reducing competition
between subgroups by using a special officer or mediator to make salient
the collective membership category and deemphasize factional allegiance.
In short, this Article posits that cohesive groups provide a more dura-
ble solution to the challenges inherent in collective litigation: the client-
client conflicts, allocation issues, and holdout problems. In the face of hard
cases, of instability and disunity, a group that has made promises and as-
surances to one another can invoke social norms of promise-keeping, social
agglomeration, compatibility, and the desire for means-end coherence to
achieve consensus. Thus, by focusing on group cohesion and the obliga-
tions that follow from group membership, this alternative reallocates power
to the claimants themselves. Make no mistake: this new approach funda-
mentally modifies the attorney's role. Unlike most scholarship on this
topic-including most prominently the American Law Institute's Principles
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation-this Article does not concede that the
attorney rightly acts as the fulcrum in aggregate litigation." Instead, the
power imbalance between dispersed claimants and their attorney causes
many of the conflicts in nonclass aggregation. Strengthening group cohe-
sion restores the tether between the group and its agent and better situates
the group to monitor the litigation.
12. This idea is distinct from a contract because mere promises are not legally enforceable. See
infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. For more on how contracts might reinforce this notion of
obligation, see infra note 224 and accompanying text.
13. The dominant paradigm emphasizes the principal-agent problem and accepts the attorney-agent
as the litigation architect and director. This prevailing approach is seen most recently in the American
Law Institute's current project on the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITG. (Proposed Final Draft 2009). My intent is not to downplay the impor-
tance of that invaluable project, but to challenge some of its principal assumptions.
8 [Vol. 61:1:1
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I. HAZARDS OF NONCLASS AGGREGATION
One way to think about the problems occurring in nonclass aggregation
is to characterize aggregate settlements as a social dilemma, specifically a
common pool dilemma. In social dilemmas, the payoff to each individual
for defecting rather than cooperating is greater, but everyone is better off if
each cooperates than if all act selfishly.14 Consider, for example, an indi-
vidual plaintiffs inherent conflict with the group's collective interests. A
plaintiff who defects by demanding a premium for her consent rather than
cooperating with other litigants receives a higher payout." And, assuming
the settlement offer is fair, all plaintiffs are better off if each cooperates
than if one holds out. Enough holdouts could derail an offer contingent on
a certain percentage of acceptances and no one would receive anything. In
short, the more litigants who choose to pursue their private interests at the
expense of the group's collective interests, the more the group falls short
of achieving its collective goals.
Initiating litigation, even aggregate litigation, frequently presents no
explicit social dilemma because litigants assume, correctly or not, that the
defendant has abundant resources to fully compensate each individual. But
at some point, typically once the defendant makes a settlement offer, the
common pool's limits become apparent. While distributive justice concerns
prevail until this triggering event occurs, once plaintiffs realize that not
everyone will actualize the full value of their losses, procedural justice
concerns shift to the forefront.16 If claimants initiated individual lawsuits,
then each might push to obtain the biggest possible portion of the settle-
ment's proceeds. Clearly, it would be better for all involved to show a
little restraint or work in unison, so that no one deserving compensation is
left with nothing. But, if no one else is going to restrain herself, then there
is little incentive to be the one who does.
This Part highlights the conflicts and dilemmas that arise in deciding
when and whether to settle as well as in allocating settlement proceeds
among the plaintiffs. It begins with the context leading to aggregate settle-
ments and then explains how that context breeds conflict-conflict between
clients and between clients and their attorneys. Those conflicts are
14. Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 170 (1980); see also
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (explaining the tragedy
of freedom in a commons); Elinor Ostrom, Engaging Impossibilities and Possibilities, in 2
ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARTYA SEN 522, 525-28 (Kaushik Basu
& Ravi Kambur eds., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1304701.
15. If litigants' primary objective is injunctive or declaratory relief, then the group is far more
likely to be certified as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Consequently, my concern here is with litigants
who seek damages, but cannot be certified as a class under Rule 23(b)(3).
16. David A. Schroeder et al., A Recursive Model for Changing Justice Concerns in Social Dilem-
mas, in NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS 142, 143-44 (Anders Biel et
al. eds., 2008).
2009]1 9
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most pronounced in determining whether to accept a settlement offer and,
once accepted, in allocating funds among claimants.
A. Conflicts
Nonclass aggregation can occur in any number of ways: some plaintiffs
may purposefully enter into contingency-fee agreements with specific at-
torneys who represent similar plaintiffs; others might be grouped through
coercive court-mandated consolidation and transfer procedures such as
multidistrict transfer, joinder under Rule 20, and consolidation under Rule
42." Other litigants may first form a group and then seek collective repre-
sentation. Still others may join the litigation post-aggregation after hearing
about it in the news or through attorney advertising." Thus, a single law-
yer or firm may represent multiple claimants in a single case, or might
coordinate individually filed actions. To illustrate:
Clusters within Nonclass Aggregation:
Figure 1:
ese are geographic clusters or
dividuals entering into litigation
t ther who are represented by a
si attorney. The aggregation may
or m ot end here. dividuals are represented by the same or different attorneys
and are clustered together voluntarily (through cooperating
-- plaintiffs' attorneys) or involuntarily (through court-ordered
transfer and consolidation). Geographic dispersion is likely.
Holdouts are those within the group who refuse to settle.
Outliers are those outside of the group who have claims
pending against the same defendant.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict transfer); FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive party join-
der); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (consolidation).
18. See Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 304 (1996); Paul D. Rheingold, The
Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 1-3 (1982). In aggregate litigation, the
attorney is often the catalyst in motivating group membership and in defining group goals. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Para-
digm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 432-33 (1999); Rheingold, supra, at 2. Richard Nagareda provides a
helpful overview of the client recruitment process in his book, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement.
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETrLEMENT 16-18 (2007).
10
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Despite their potential magnitude, aggregate settlements generally go
unnoticed for several reasons. Unlike class actions, which require court
approval and fairness hearings that are open to the public, the federal rules
require no special judicial oversight of nonclass aggregation.19 Aggregate
settlements thus generate few judicial opinions. Plus, though the issues
raised in mass torts routinely bear on public health and safety, these set-
tlements may include confidentiality provisions, which further insulate
them from scrutiny by judges, the academy, and the public.
Settlements advantage those most familiar with the process, the repeat
players: plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys as well as judges.20 The
economics of mass tort litigation dictates that plaintiffs' attorneys collect a
sizeable inventory of claimants through advertisements or referrals to pre-
sent a credible threat to defendants, streamline information collection and
communication, and reduce litigation and expert witness costs per claim-
ant.2 Collective litigation likewise advantages defendants by making peace
available through a broadly inclusive resolution-settlement.
Take the Vioxx settlement, for instance. By including an 85% walk-
away provision, Merck contained its liability and reassured investors; its
stock rose sharply after settling although the overall market went down that
day.22 Plaintiffs' counsel benefitted from a payday after expending signifi-
cant monetary resources, received increased publicity, and could then pur-
sue other cases." Judge Fallon, who indicated early in the litigation that he
intended to encourage settlement despite Merck's initial refusal, decreased
his docket's congestion significantly, bolstered his reputation with the Mul-
tidistrict Litigation Panel, and surely experienced some personal satisfac-
tion over engineering the agreement. In contrast to these victories, the
Vioxx deal mandated that each participating attorney recommend the set-
tlement to 100% of her eligible clients, regardless of the client's best inter-
19. See U.S. v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[B]ecause the parties are
free at any time to agree to a resolution of the dispute by private contractual agreement, and to dismiss
the lawsuit by stipulation ... the trial court plays no role in overseeing or approving any settlement
proposals."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (permitting a lawsuit to be dismissed at any time if all of the
parties consent).
20. I have previously explored this point at length and thus simply summarize it here. Chamblee
[Burch], supra note 11, at 160; see also Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571, 1577-
90 (2004) (observing the emergence of repeat players).
21. See NAGAREDA, supra note 17, at 13-14; Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate
Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769, 1774-75 (2005); Resnik et al., supra note 18, at 313.
22. Posting of Howard M. Erichson to Mass Tort Litigation Blog, The Vioxx Settlement,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass-tortlitigation/2007/l 1/the-vioxx-setti.htmil (Nov. 10, 2007).
23. Amir Efrati et al., Vioxx Settlement's Next Big Question: How to Split it Up?, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 12, 2007, at BI (noting that one plaintiffs attorney invested $300,000 in the litigation, "a signifi-
cant outlay . . . for a firm of 10 partners"); Erichson, supra note 22.
24. See Erichson, supra note 22; Jef Feeley & Leslie Snadowsky, Merck Vioxx Judge Threatens to
End Suit Consolidation, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 5, 2006.
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ests, and then withdraw from representing those who refused the deal."
The bottom line is this: claimants often bear the tax for what has become
standard practice in nonclass aggregation.
Individual plaintiffs within collective representation have little substan-
tive input or authority over how their attorney handles the case.26 Plus, the
attorney works to achieve the best result for the whole group. 27 Thus, al-
though the typical solution to shirking is monitoring, because these attor-
ney-client relationships are often attenuated, clients tend to be ineffective
monitors. As a result, conflicts arise between attorneys and their clients
and between plaintiffs and other plaintiffs over trial strategies, litigation
goals, and degrees of harm.28
One recent study interviewing both plaintiffs' attorneys and plaintiffs
found a fundamental disparity in litigation goals: attorneys assumed money
was the primary litigation objective, whereas plaintiffs wanted to be heard,
to be respected post-injury, to reveal cover-ups, and to prevent injury to
others.2 ' Even when overarching goals mesh, the strategy for attaining
those goals may differ. For instance, in representing an inventory of claim-
ants and selecting some for trial, an attorney will likely pick the strongest
cases in hopes that early victories for a few will benefit others.o Winning
early cases increases settlement pressure on the defendant, but it also
25. Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL-1657, No. 05-01657 para. 1.2.8.1 (E.D. La. 2007) (initial
settlement agreement), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/Settlement Agree
ment.pdf. Several plaintiffs' lawyers subsequently filed an emergency motion requesting to keep some
of their clients outside the settlement and noting that the settlement conflicted with ethical rules. Alex
Berenson, Lawyers Seek To Alter Settlement Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at C4. The
settlement agreement was then reinterpreted to mean that plaintiffs' attorneys would only recommend it
to a client if it was in the client's best interest.
26. A similar disconnect occurs in the corporate context between managers and shareholders. See
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 540, 555-56
(1995).
27. Burch, supra note 11, at 3. See also Chamblee [Burch], supra note 11, at 159; Howard M.
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525-26 (2003); Individual Justice, supra note 1, at 210.
28. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct outline conflicts of interests between current clients:
"there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2007).
29. Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs' Litiga-
tion Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 701, 721-25 (2007); see also Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 1359, 1362-63 (1992); Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete
Contracting: The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1329, 1369-70 (2003) (discussing
this phenomenon as "projection bias").
30. Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
301, 306-07 (2003); see also Erichson, supra note 27, at 559-60. The strongest cases are not necessar-
ily the most deserving of a large payout. That is, others may have injuries that are more serious, but
causation issues may complicate the case.
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facilitates a lottery of sorts: a win may yield a significant payout for those
chosen for trial, yet make the remaining clients only relatively better off. 3 1
These contradictory motivations also affect the decision to settle. For
example, suppose a defendant offers to settle a case for nominal value ei-
ther before a complaint is ever filed or soon thereafter. The clients may not
be inclined to take it, particularly if they want to reveal cover-ups and pre-
vent others from injury. They might desire institutional reforms or product
recalls that only discovery and publicity produce. Or maybe they think that
additional work would lead to a better monetary result. But the lawyer
might see the settlement as more attractive, particularly if she is working
on a contingency fee. She would receive roughly one-third of the settle-
ment value rather quickly and could then move on to other cases. Granted,
additional work could lead to a larger pay out for the attorney as well.
Still, it involves further risks and only marginal increases for the attorney,
thereby misaligning client and attorney interests.32 This conflict arises be-
cause of the attorney's dual role: she is not simply acting as the client's
agent, she is financing the litigation, making her a creditor and the litiga-
tion a joint venture.33 Agency rules address the former relationship, the
agency itself, but ignore and even eschew the other roles.
Ethical rules attempt to curb this conflict by giving clients the authority
to settle and to reject offers for less than what they want.35 But there are
additional concerns when agents represent more than one principal, par-
ticularly when those principals have competing interests. Benefitting one
client might prove detrimental to another. Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8(g) nominally addresses the problem by requiring a lawyer
representing two or more clients to first obtain informed consent and to
then disclose the existence and nature of both the claims and the values
received by the others participating in the settlement." Put differently, this
rule purports to guard against agent disincentives and misallocation prob-
lems by giving plaintiffs the right to reject their settlement offer and to
insist on either a higher payout or a trial. 37 This assumes, however, that
plaintiffs know the value of their claim vis-A-vis the other claims as well as
31. Silver, supra note 30, at 306-07.
32. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190
(1987).
33. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 331, 340-41 (2000) (observing the same phenomenon in the class action context); see
also Silver, supra note 30, at 303 (positing that Coffee's argument applies with equal force to mass tort
representations because "[tihe plaintiffs' attorneys provide crucial financing"). Yet, getting rid of the
contingency fee and attorney financing is not a realistic solution.
34. Silver, supra note 30, at 303.
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007).
37. Paul H. Edelman, Richard A. Nagareda & Charles Silver, The Allocation Problem in Multiple-
Claimant Representations, 14 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 100 (2006).
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the discount factor for litigating en masse." Otherwise, they would make
an uninformed decision. And recent empirical work demonstrates that lay-
people generally follow their attorney's advice on when to settle and what
to accept, which further limits this "solution's" efficacy.39
B. Allocation Issues
Plaintiffs' attorneys likewise have myriad incentives to misallocate set-
tlement proceeds among clients.40 For instance, a lawyer might have to pay
referral fees for some claimants but none for others, or she might have
repeat business with particular clients and want to further that relation-
ship.4' To illustrate, after receiving a settlement offer in the Fen-phen liti-
gation, one plaintiffs' law firm sued the firm to which it referred clients.
The referring firm alleged that the receiving firm intentionally allocated
more money to its direct clients than to the referred clients in order to pay
fewer referral fees.42 Whether the client had been referred to the law firm,
as opposed to retaining the firm directly, determined the size of the client's
payout.43 Misallocation might also arise when an attorney aims to enhance
her reputation with potential clients in a specialty area. She thus has incen-
tives to overpay weak injuries-which are more prevalent-and underpay
severe ones, a criticism commonly leveled at asbestos attorneys."
As noted, the traditional answer to these conundrums is to give claim-
ants the power to settle.45 This control forces both plaintiffs' attorneys and
defendants to care about the settlement amount and its allocation.46 When
defendants decide to settle, they almost uniformly desire global resolution.
38. Id. at 108.
39. See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have Their Way? An
Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 277, 285 (2007); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1,
30 (1988); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 82 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of
Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial
Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 291-97, 318-19 (1999).
40. John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem Products-or, Why
Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients'Money, 84 VA. L. REv. 1541, 1542 (1998).
41. Edelman et al., supra note 37, at 99; see also Coffee, supra note 40, at 1545-46.
42. In re New York Diet Drug Litig., 850 N.Y.S.2d 408, 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Parker &
Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72-73 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); see also Edelman et al., supra
note 37, at 99. These claims were eventually dismissed. Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 858 N.Y.S.2d
156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
43. Anthony Lin, Trial Ordered Over Firm's Role in 'Fen-Phen' Pact, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Mar.
28, 2007, at 2. The parties disagreed about whether the settlement was a lump sum aggregate settle-
ment. Id.
44. Edelman et al., supra note 37, at 100.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(a) (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(1) (2000).
46. Edelman et al., supra note 37, at 100-01.
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By design, they thus want to include as many plaintiffs as possible. Em-
bedding walk-away provisions within the settlement offer allows defendants
to exit the arrangement if less than the requisite number of claimants-
often approximately 85%-agrees.4 7 In theory, this sounds reasonable.
That may not be the case, however, in practice.
To further encourage agreement, defendants might add most-favored-
nation provisions and liens on their assets in favor of settlement partici-
pants. Most-favored-nation provisions assure those remaining in the set-
tlement that they will not be worse off for so doing by guaranteeing that
those opting out will not receive a more generous offer.48 Thus, although
individuals could decline the offer, they would need extreme risk toler-
ance; they must effectively choose between guaranteed benefits or litigating
their claims until judgment. Further, even a claimant with a successful
judgment, one higher than the settlement offer, would have to stand in line
behind settlement participants if the agreement included a lien on defen-
dant's assets.49 Accordingly, risk preferences must account not only for
trial or continued litigation, but also for the possibility of fewer assets from
which to collect.o Even people with strong cases are more likely to settle
on the cheap if they need funds immediately, either because of lower so-
cioeconomic status or because the injury has decreased their life expectan-
cies." In short, through aggregate settlement design, repeat plaintiffs' and
defense attorneys have constructed something akin to a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-
out class action, but without the judicial protections afforded to certified
class actions.52
47. See Erichson, supra note 21, at 1793-94.
48. See James M. Anderson, Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential
Settlements: Lessons from Bayer's Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy, 18-19 (RAND Institute for Civil
Justice, Working Paper No. 617, Sept. 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers
/2008/RANDWR617.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
49. See In re Inter-op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
Granted, as Richard Nagareda has pointed out to me, this is quite rare. It is the threat itself (as opposed
to the trigger) that is effective in deterring opt outs. See Kathryn E. Spier, The Use of "Most-Favored-
Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation, 34 RAND J. ECON. 78, 80 (2003).
50. Inter-op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 354 (upholding as fair and reasonable a
23(b)(3) class action settlement agreement with a most-favored-nation provision as well as a provision
that created a lien on the defendants' assets in favor of settlement participants). As Dickie Scruggs,
who designed the settlement, describes, "if anybody opts out, they [sic] still have to try their case, win
their case, win their appeal, and then there would be no assets to satisfy their judgment, because they
are all pledged to the class." Jess Bravin, Sulzer Medica Reaches Novel Class-Action Pact, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 16, 2001, at A3. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit expressed doubts about the settlement's legiti-
macy and the attorneys ultimately removed the lien and increased the assets available to the class.
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 491
(forthcoming 2009).
51. Edelman et al., supra note 37, at 100; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
52. Judicial protections include those in Rule 23: that the judge will appoint class counsel, approve
a settlement's fairness, and approve the class attorney's fee. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
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Settlement agreements requiring nearly unanimous consent, whether
through walk-away percentages, liens on defendant's assets, or most-
favored-nation provisions, pressure claimants to accept the terms. But
lump-sum settlements conditioned on nearly unanimous claimant consent
go further. By "lump-sum" settlements, I mean instances in which the de-
fendant approaches plaintiffs' counsel and offers a sum of money to settle
all cases without regard to how it is apportioned.53 They create an ultima-
tum game: if a claimant rejects (or enough claimants reject) the settlement,
then no one receives anything. This entices certain plaintiffs to withhold
consent, or "hold out," until they receive a disproportionately higher pay-
out.
At the risk of oversimplifying multifaceted obstacles, one way to sum-
marize the holdout problem, client-client conflicts, attorney-client con-
flicts, and allocation issues is as a single concept: disunity. Granted, fric-
tion exists between multiple plaintiffs'-side entities, but even those are not
so diverse. Disunity arises between three factions: attorneys and their cli-
ents (agency problems), plaintiffs and other plaintiffs (group problems),
and plaintiffs' attorneys and other plaintiffs' attorneys (competition prob-
lems). This Article focuses on problems with the group dynamic, specifi-
cally conflicts between plaintiffs created by holdouts and outliers, those
outside the group. Yet, addressing group problems diminishes the agency
problem and, less directly, the competition problem. Once formed, cohe-
sive groups are more likely to be able to negotiate with their attorneys and
request pertinent information about their cases, perform their traditional
litigation monitoring function, and navigate client-based conflicts. Assum-
ing that coordinating and consolidating large-scale litigation is systemically
desirable, then we should explore ways to remove obstacles that increase
its costs and undermine normative goals such as fairness, compensation,
and deterrence. That endeavor has traditionally involved tinkering with
consent and external coercion. Yet, moral obligations and group cohesive-
ness might affect cooperation such that intragroup pressures and norms
make external coercion less necessary.
II. FROM MEDIEVAL GROUPS TO FACEBOOK FRIENDS
Simply put, group members have inclusionary and exclusionary con-
cerns, and legal procedures should consider and capitalize on these group
dynamics. Empirical studies from social psychology, behavioral econom-
ics, and even evolutionary biology demonstrate that once people consider
themselves part of a group, they change their behaviors and motives as
well as their views about procedural and distributive justice; their identity
53. Erichson, supra note 21, at 1787-88.
16 [Vol. 61: 1:1
HeinOnline -- 61 Ala. L. Rev. 16 2009-2010
Litigating Groups
and welfare become intertwined with the group's identity and welfare.'
Alternatively, people perceiving the aggregate simply as a collection of
individuals tend to promote their own private interest."
Group members exhibit other-regarding preferences-trust, reciprocity,
and altruism-toward other members." Their fairness considerations
change based on whether the situation involves another group member (in-
clusionary concerns) or individuals outside the group (exclusionary con-
cerns).57 Cohesive group members are more likely to cooperate with one
another and care about the collective outcome, and less likely to exit the
group when doing so benefits the individual rather than the group." These
theory-based insights suggest that group membership plays a pivotal role in
attitude changes, particularly when group identity is salient and relevant to
the attitudinal issue.59 Shared histories, implicit feedback, and trust, for
example, offer insights about whether individuals will cooperate or defect.
Thus, this Part evaluates what constitutes a litigation group, what
makes an agglomeration of plaintiffs into a community, and how litigation
groups might be more cohesive. Analyzing plaintiffs in these terms helps
predict whether they will consent to a settlement that is in the group's best
interests, hold out for a higher individual payoff, or build consensus to
reject a settlement failing to meet the group's litigation goals. Then, as the
last Part of this Article explores, one way to model these concerns for fair-
ness and other-regarding preferences is by positing that group members
54. Nancy R. Buchan et al., Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of
Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, 60 J. ECON. BEHAv. &
ORG. 373, 374-75 (2006); Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and
Large-Scale Cooperation, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3 (2004); Mark Van Vugt & Claire M. Hart,
Social Identity as Social Glue: The Origins of Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
585, 586 (2004); Kelly S. Bouas & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Di-
lemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144, 1145 (1996); Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M.
Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 513, 526-27 (1994); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Cultural
Transmission and the Evolution of Cooperative Behavior, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY 325 (1982); Robert Ax-
elrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 1390-91 (1981).
55. Arjaan P. Wit & Norbert L. Kerr, "Me Versus Just Us Versus Us All" Categorization and
Cooperation in Nested Social Dilemmas, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 616, 617 (2002).
56. See Buchan et al., supra note 54, at 374-75 (reviewing the literature on other-regarding prefer-
ences). One need not limit this inquiry into groups to moral and political philosophy, social psychol-
ogy, or even behavioral law and economics. The intersection of law and evolutionary biology also
demonstrates that cooperation allows humans and nonhumans to compete more effectively for resources
and changes group dynamics when repeat players are involved. See, e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, supra
note 54, at 1390; Boyd & Richerson, supra note 54, at 325; Henrich, supra note 54, at 3-4.
57. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Intrinsic Versus Community-Based Justice Models: When Does
Group Membership Matter?, 46 J. Soc. ISSUES 83, 84-86 (1990).
58. Leigh Thompson, Laura J. Kray & E. Allan Lind, Cohesion and Respect: An Examination of
Group Decision Making in Social and Escalation Dilemmas, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 289,
291-93 (1998); Van Vugt & Hart, supra note 54, at 587.
59. Joel Cooper, Kimberly A. Kelly & Kimberlee Weaver, Attitudes, Norms, and Social Groups,
in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 259, 260 (Michael A. Hogg
& R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001).
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have a sense of obligation toward other group members. Consequently, if
group members exhibit these concerns and the concerns can be character-
ized as a feeling of obligation, then it follows that we should harness these
tendencies by crafting laws and procedures that foster group cohesion. In
short, using groups to overcome the problems in nonclass aggregation not
only makes sense from a group responsibility perspective, but may also
harmonize with wealth maximization and individual autonomy goals.
A. Group Formation
Social psychologists have developed several theories about how groups
form and what makes them cohesive. Described as a "basic bond" or "un-
iting force," group cohesiveness has been defined in many ways over the
years.' Most definitions contain ideas about commitment, consensus, at-
traction among group members, connectedness, working toward a common
goal, unity of purpose, and placing significance in common norms." Vari-
ables catalyzing group cohesion include: physical and social immediacy;
homogeneity through shared experiences, organizations, or historic events;
and unity or overlap in goals, values, and intentions." On the other hand,
variables destabilizing group cohesion include: competition, low levels of
claim and damage homogeneity, weak collective intentions, few shared
life-defining experiences, greater geographic dispersion, and incompatible
litigation goals." Accordingly, group formation and group cohesion is mul-
tidimensional and context dependent.'
Relying on this broad definition of group cohesion, this Subpart first
considers a few types of everyday groups and traces collective litigation's
historic roots back to traditional communities. It then delves into what con-
stitutes a group within nonclass aggregation and what characteristics make
some groups more cohesive than others.
1. Everyday Groups
Before entering the aggregate litigation morass, consider a few intuitive
everyday examples of varying group cohesion: families, friends, col-
leagues, neighborhoods, and cities. Close-knit groups, such as long-term
friends, tend to cooperate more with one another than less cohesive
60. Albert A. Cota et al., The Structure of Group Cohesion, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 572, 574, 577 (1995).
61. Id. at 574.
62. See R. Scott Tindale et al., Shared Cognition in Small Groups, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 5.
63. Id.
64. T.K. Ahn, R. Mark Isaac & Timothy C. Salmon, Endogenous Group Formation, 10 J. PUB.
ECON. THEORY 171, 172 (2008).
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groups, such as unacquainted individuals.65 Groups of friends are highly
cohesive; they have voluntarily chosen friendship and share backgrounds
and experiences. That they feel obligations and commitments to one an-
other comes as no surprise. We could say the same about families; no one
chooses their relatives, but most would feel some obligation toward them.
Groups extend beyond families and friends. Georg Simmel suggests
that social groups include a wide array: "Sociation . . . ranges all the way
from the momentary getting together for a walk to founding a family . . .
from the temporary aggregation of hotel guests to the intimate bonds of a
medieval guild."66 In his now classic text, Stephen Yeazell traces the mod-
ern-day class action back to medieval guilds where people within rural
villages, groups of villeins who "tithed" by collectively self-policing for
the King ("frankpledge tithings"), and religious parishes comprised "'the
community of the vill. "'67 Community members, as defined geographi-
cally, each shared in the duties, privileges, and obligations of villeinage
membership." Describing this communalism in 1911, Paul Vinogradoff
explained that all community members were jointly liable for any duty that
might principally be assigned to just one of them. Accordingly, manor
courts routinely imposed collective liability on villages for collective obli-
gations, often regardless of who was individually responsible for trampling
peas or bad plowing.70
On the other hand, those living in medieval towns voluntarily formed
highly cohesive merchant guilds, craft guilds, and boroughs through social
bonds." This sociability might be seen either as voluntary cooperation that
parlayed into economic success and mutual advantage or a necessary evil
given that strangers might treat them as one another's sureties regardless.7 2
As phrased by Robert Bone, "Obligation and privilege attached to the
group qua group, with the group allocating the burdens and benefits among
its members. Moreover, each group member was individually liable for the
entire group obligation and had to resort to internal group mechanisms to
spread the burden."73
65. Thompson et al., supra note 58, at 289.
66. MARGARET GILBERT, Societies, Membership, and Obligation, in A THEORY OF POLITICAL
OBLIGATION 91, 97 (2006) (quoting Georg Simmel).
67. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
41-48 (1987).
68. Id. at 42-52; see also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiv-
ing the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 219 (1990). I thank Richard
Nagareda for reminding me of this point and credit him with subtitling Part II.
69. YEAZELL, supra note 67, at 48 (quoting PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR
318-19 (rev. 2d ed. MacMillan 1911) (1905)).
70. Id. at 50-51.
71. Id. at 42-44, 58-60.
72. Id. at 60.
73. Bone, supra note 68, at 220.
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Unlike medieval communities, plaintiffs within nonclass aggregation
often lack the interpersonal relationships and geographic proximity that
gave rise to medieval communal obligations. Accordingly, what modem
day obligations do we owe to individuals we have never met? We might
owe them nothing. Nevertheless, as shown, examples exist to the contrary.
Recall the example where a car hits you from behind, forcing you to then
run into the car in front of you, which injures that person. You may have a
duty to rescue that person by virtue of your involvement in an accident that
put her in peril.74 You certainly did not choose to be involved in an acci-
dent, but now you are all in the accident together and obligations flow
from that circumstance. Or consider the creation of a limited fund or em-
ployment discrimination class action." You might prefer to litigate by
yourself; you might recover even more, but that option has been restricted
by practical necessity. Now you are part of a collective that includes eve-
ryone else with similar claims against the company. Like villeinage mem-
bership, procedural rules dictate that you litigate together; you have no
option to opt out. 6 Some federal courts even require litigants to bring pat-
tern-or-practice discrimination cases as class actions." Thus, choice is not
the only mechanism for becoming a group member nor is it the only way
we incur obligations to one another.
2. Modem Litigation Groups
Moral and political philosophers writing about shared action and shared
agency reframe coercion and consent into notions about obligation, inten-
tion, and community." When individuals jointly commit to litigate to-
gether, for example, or when they engage in shared activity or create a
group policy, they can simultaneously incur moral obligations to one an-
other not to opt out of their shared endeavor. Translated into traditional
Rule 23(b)(3) class action jargon, they have remained in. But not all liti-
gants intend to be part of the group. This Subpart thus engages these phi-
losophical underpinnings to explore a few types of groups and communities
that give rise to interpersonal obligations in nonclass aggregation. It is be-
yond this Article's scope to argue in any depth the origins and existence
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 37 cmt. d (2005); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40
N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (2).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (3).
77. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other
grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866-67 n.6 (7th Cir.
1985); accord Celestine v. Petroleous de Venezuelia SA, 266 F.3d 343, 3 55 (5th Cir. 2001). The
rationale is that injunctive relief is indivisible, thus any litigation inherently affects the group and
should be pursued as group litigation. See Allen v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471 (7th
Cir. 2004).
78. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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of such obligations-others have persuasively covered that ground far bet-
ter than I can do here. Instead, I introduce these ideas in a basic way and
depend on their intuitive appeal, while providing additional sources for the
interested reader.
Before delving into the specifics of groups within nonclass aggregation,
it is worth distinguishing how class litigation fits into the bigger picture. In
certified class actions, the judge has made a legal determination-usually
under Rule 23(b)(3) in mass torts-that the group is sufficiently cohesive to
be treated as an entity for litigation purposes. In so ruling, the judge certi-
fies that common issues predominate over individual ones, someone with
injuries typical of the class adequately represents its members, the attorney
is sufficiently knowledgeable and well-funded to pursue the class's inter-
ests, class members are too numerous to join, and the class is manage-
able." Once certified, the "client" is the class, the entity itself.' As David
Shapiro describes, the individual class member "must tie his fortunes to
those of the group with respect to the litigation, its progress, and its out-
come."" In that sense, the class is somewhat analogous to a private asso-
ciation such as a corporation or trade union.8 2 This suggests that a class, by
virtue of its certification (and subclassing), might have an ontological status
that is more than the aggregate of its individual class members.
To explain, consider these two examples. First, two individuals dance
by a window to warn a third that the police are coming for her. Both in-
tend to warn and are each morally culpable for their collective action.83
Contrast that example with a large corporation that has general will.' The
corporation's long-term interests are more than a sum its officers', direc-
tors', or even shareholders' desires and beliefs." In fact, those interests
might even conflict." The corporation takes on a life of its own. The danc-
ing individuals are involved in a simple collective and are thus ontologi-
cally distinct from a corporate entity." The class action is more akin to a
corporation than the dancers. Although categorizing the class in this way
raises a constellation of questions about whether the complex intentions of
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3).
80. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 919; see also Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rule-
making Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 26 (1996).
81. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 919.
82. Id. at 921.
83. Michael McKenna, Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 16, 16-17 (2006); see generally Christopher Kutz, Acting Together, 61 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that the challenge of collective action is "bridging the
gap between the statements true of the group and the statements true of its members").
84. McKenna, supra note 83, at 18-19.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id.
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individual class members are reducible to a shared intention of the collec-
tive, they are outside this Article's scope."
Nonclass aggregation, the subject of this piece, falls somewhere be-
tween these two examples, but the collection of plaintiffs is not as easily
identifiable as an entity. This group of litigants is more ephemeral than
institutional; litigants' overlapping participatory intentions distinguish the
members as opposed to a class certification definition." If class certifica-
tion has been proposed, the judge has denied it, thereby indicating that the
class is unmanageable or not all injuries are sufficiently similar. But this
does not mean that plaintiffs will not litigate en masse or that the court will
not coordinate and consolidate for its own purposes.
Litigants in nonclass aggregation form a social group of sorts, but one
that is perhaps more temporary and ad hoc when compared with conven-
tional groups such as friends and families.' Some litigation groups are
more immediately cohesive than others, such as territory-based communi-
ties experiencing the effects of toxic torts or single-incident mass accidents.
But communities can form despite geographic distance, particularly if there
is a significant common experience, a social network, or a shared emo-
tional connection."
Labor unions, veterans' groups, community organizations, and home-
owner's associations are classic examples of preexisting groups. For in-
88. Michael McKenna's work on agent meaning theory would be a good start. Id. at 16. See also
Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 279 (1996); John Searle, Collec-
tive Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401, 401-06 (P.R. Cohen et al. eds.,
1990). This notion about the reducible intent of the collective as either an aggregation of individual
intent or some superordinate entity intent might also have interesting implications for punitive damages
literature. For work on the entity theory of class actions, see Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due
Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002);
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 919. For a strong dissent claiming that the class is far more than an agglom-
eration of its members, see Redish & Larsen, supra note 1, at 1587-97.
89. See Kutz, supra note 83, at 28 ("Ephemeral groups are groups whose identity as a group con-
sists just in the fact that a set of persons is acting jointly with overlapping participatory intentions....
Institutional groups, by contrast, have identity criteria that do not wholly consist in the presence of
overlapping participatory intentions.").
90. See MARGARET GILBERT, Societies as Plural Subjects, in A THEORY OF POLITICAL
OBLIGATION, supra note 66, at 165 ("[I]t is common to take those who act together as constituting a
social group, and [1] have argued that such people constitute a plural subject in my sense."); E.T.
Hiller, The Community as a Social Group, 6 AM. Soc. REv. 189, 189 (1941) ("In briefest terms, we
may say that a social group comprises persons acting with reference to given aims, in the prosecution
of which an integration of roles and an ordering of social relations come into play.").
91. See David W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory,
14 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 7, 8, 13-14 (1986) ("A shared emotional connection is based, in part, on
a shared history. It is not necessary that group members have participated in the history in order to
share it, but they must identify with it."). Some literature suggests that even minimal contact is unnec-
essary. Rather, the "minimal (sufficient) condition for psychological group formation is the recognition
and acceptance of some self-defining social categorization." Cristina Bicchieri, Covenants without
Swords: Group Identity, Norms, and Communication in Social Dilemmas, 24 RATIONALITY & Soc.
192, 206 (2002). Thus, "[slocial interaction, common fate, proximity, similarity, common goals or
shared threats are not necessary for group formation, even if they usually increase the cohesiveness of
an existing group." Id.
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stance, unions played a central role in initiating early asbestos litigation by
screening members for respiratory illnesses and referring them to attor-
neys.' Similarly, veterans' groups organized Agent Orange litigants and
warned Vietnam veterans of possible exposure risks.9 Other groups form
after the triggering event, such as the Asbestos Victims of America, the
Dalkon Shield victims' organizations, and the Silicone Breast Implant or-
ganizations.94 Likewise, the Buffalo Creek Citizens Committee formed two
weeks after the flood, elected representatives, and sought legal counsel.95
The Internet further facilitates interaction opportunities. For example,
after Merck proposed a Vioxx settlement, plaintiffs formed a members-
only group, the "Merck Settlement Group," on Yahoo!'s groups page to
discuss the offer.96 In the two months after the offer, there were 3,498
messages posted, with 12,445 messages posted from November 2007
through October 2008." The group's purpose and the members' intent was
"to give plaintiffs a place where they could share their stories, study the
settlement and just vent if that is what they needed." 9 8 Similar groups
formed on Facebook, such as the "Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx
Victims" group, which petitioned for compensation on behalf of British
victims,99 and the "Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by Vietnamese Victims"
group, created as a "common interest-beliefs & causes" organization.'"
In short, groups routinely form before litigation to initiate claims and be-
cause of the litigation itself.
i. Plural Subjects
Thus far, the main point is that mere membership in a group, whether
chosen or not, and whether welfare enhancing or not, can sometimes give
rise to obligations. As observed, many types of communities exist and the
obligations flowing from those communities depend a great deal on the
community itself. This Subpart considers what constitutes a community of
92. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A
Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1023 (1993).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1024; Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Net-
work, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 863, 919-21.
95. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 6-7 (1976).
96. Merck Settlement Group page, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MerckSettlement/.
97. Id.
98. E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 18, 2008, 14:22
EST) (on file with author).
99. Facebook, Equal Treatment for Non-US Vioxx Victims, http://www.facebook.com/group.
php?sid=7eefl56f24dacee8951038d54df30e2e&gid=8611202842.
100. Facebook, Agent Orange Lawsuit Filed by Vietnamese Victims, http://www.facebook.
com/group.php?sid=0&gid=2619520859.
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plaintiffs by invoking a flexible phrasing: "plural subject."1o' "Plural sub-
ject" is an umbrella term that most broadly refers to those instances where
multiple individuals-a set of "I's"-becomes a single, plural subject-a
"we." What makes them a plural subject varies greatly from shared de-
sires, interests, and circumstances, to shared intent concerning a shared
activity, to joint commitments, to actually developing a shared group pol-
icy, to using that policy to govern subsequent collective deliberations. 03
Plural subjects occur in all kinds of everyday situations. They also com-
monly occur in mass litigation, where injuries and wrongdoings bring peo-
ple together. My concern here, however, is on a particular subset of plural
subjects, those found within nonclass aggregation.
Plural subjects include individuals collectively participating in a joint
activity, who intend that certain plans should come to fruition, or who
share a commitment." For instance, litigants might be jointly committed
to establishing causation, or might share other commitments, beliefs, val-
ues, or emotions.'o Individuals might share a commitment to seeing the
defendant brought to justice or they might all believe in product recall,
retribution, institutional reform, or even apology seeking. Take, for ex-
101. I borrow this term from Margaret Gilbert, but I do not attach the same meaning to it that she
does. GILBERT, supra note 9, at 3.
102. As a powerful example, consider Ken Feinberg's words about California families experiencing
the effects of September 11: "It was as if the families had chosen to deal with the 9/11 tragedy by
suppressing individual protestations of life's unfairness and joining together. 'We' replaced 'I.' 'We
have questions for you, Mr. Feinberg,' they said. 'And we grieve together.'" KENNETH R. FEINBERG,
WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 60
(2005).
103. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Valuing and Frameworks, in STRuCTURES OF AGENCY 283,
285-86 (Michael E. Bratman ed., 2007).
104. See Michael E. Bratman, Dynamics of Sociality, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 1, 2 (2006) [herein-
after Bratman, Dynamics]; Raimo Tuomela, Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode, 30 MIDWEST STUD.
PHIL. 35, 35 (2006); see MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation, in FACES OF
INTENTION 130, 130-31 (1999) [hereinafter BRATMAN, Shared Intention]. Bratman uses the term
"plans" in a technical sense. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 2-3
(1987) [hereinafter BRATMAN, INTENTION]. Although my use of the term here does not conflict with
his definition, I use it in its colloquial sense.
105. See Margaret Gilbert, Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for
Group Members, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 94, 100 (2006) [hereinafter Gilbert, Collective Moral Re-
sponsibility]; see also MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, in FACES OF INTENTION,
supra note 104, at 93, 94; MARGARET GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation, in A THEORY OF
POLITICAL OBLIGATION, supra note 66, at 125, 136-37 [hereinafter GILBERT, Joint Commitment and
Obligation]; Craig D. Parks, The Predictive Ability of Social Values in Resource Dilemmas and Public
Goods Games, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 431, 436 (1994) (finding that social values
predict behavior in resource dilemma situations).
The idea, as I use it here, is similar to but by no means synonymous with Margaret Gilbert's "joint
commitment," and Michael Bratman's "shared intention." GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation,
supra, at 134 ("A joint commitment is a kind of commitment of the will."); Michael Bratman, Shared
Intention, 104 ETHICS 97 (1993) [hereinafter Bratman, Shared]; Gilbert, Collective Moral Responsibil-
ity, supra, at 100-01; see also Raimo Tuomela, We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions, 51
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 249, 249-77 (1991).
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ample, the Merck Settlement Group, formed in response to the Vioxx liti-
gation. The group's moderator explains its objective:
In the first months, we were all united in our efforts to study and
understand the settlement. As we began to see the inequities in the
settlement, we all agreed that we needed to bring these inequities to
the attention of the public in order to get [its] support to stop the
settlement and get other plaintiffs to reject the settlement. We all
agreed that we had to hit all the blogs we could find and talk with
anyone in the media who would listen."
Unlike the Merck Settlement Group, it may be that not all litigants
know the precise nature of the goal so long as they are ready to commit to
it once it becomes more specific."' For instance, a group of us may go to
the movies together every weekend but take turns picking the movie. Al-
though I do not expressly commit to seeing that particular movie, I have
expressed a willingness to see whatever movie is chosen. That choice is
thus the specific mechanism for triggering the action. Thus, litigants may
all commit to prevailing against a particular defendant and may have indi-
cated that together they will execute whatever litigation strategy their attor-
ney suggests. They are jointly committed to a plan but may not know the
particulars.
The group may be attractive to its members for highly diverse rea-
sons."o' Accordingly, joint commitments do not mandate shared reasons or
desires. In fact, they do not even necessitate agreement that the shared ac-
tivity is superior to its alternatives." For instance, within a group of po-
tential toxic tort litigants, some might suggest involving the Environmental
Protection Agency, whereas others prefer self-help remedies. Deciding to
litigate is therefore a product of bargaining and compromise.
Because the individuals have overlapping intentions, desires, and aspi-
rations, those communal features serve as a backdrop for bargaining about
how to achieve the activity or object. This accounts for the plurality of
goals within aggregate litigation and allows litigants within the collective to
be richly textured and to modify, change, fulfill, or rethink particular
106. E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 20, 2008, 01:22
EST) (on file with author).
107. GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation, supra note 105, at 140-41.
108. Neal Gross & William E. Martin, On Group Cohesiveness, 57 AM. J. Soc. 546, 547 (1952)
(emphasizing the strength of relational bonds between and among group members under varying condi-
tions should define group cohesiveness).
109. See BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 292.
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positions.no Similarly, it allows an individual litigant to desire that a group
of litigants perform some or all litigation-related activities together."'
Once individuals share ideas, activities, and intentions, they may make
commitments to one another and develop norms for stabilizing and direct-
ing their future collective endeavors.' 12 Assuming these associations are not
merely short-term and nonconsequential, these commitments and norms-
both societal norms and the group's norms-may include a moral obliga-
tion to one another not to opt out of the venture.113
The following diagrams provide a basic illustration of a plural subject
and its more cohesive subsets of shared cooperative activity and shared
goals or policies."' The overlapping areas demonstrate the degree of
shared desires, intentions, aspirations, or values.
Figure 2:
Plural Subjects Shared Cooperative Activity Shared Goals or
Policies
ii. Shared Cooperative Activity
Once committed, sometimes people within plural subjects use reason-
ing and bargaining to pressure one another to agree about how to accom-
plish their shared end."' That end might be something general, such as
110. See Gilbert, Collective Moral Responsibility, supra note 105, at 102.
111. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, I Intend that We J, in FACES OF INTENTION, supra note 104, at
142, 144-45.
112. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION, supra note 104, at 109,
121 ("Much of our relevant planning may occur after we have arrived at our shared intention."); Brat-
man, Dynamics, supra note 104, at 6.
113. MARGARET GILBERT, What is it for Us to Intend?, in SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 9, at 14, 16-17; Bratman, Dynamics, supra note 104, at 1, 6-7. 1 explain the circumstances that
might constitute a moral obligation in Part III.B. 1.
114. I thank Manuel Utset for this idea.
115. See BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 292; see also Gary E. Bolton et al., How Communication
Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation, 49 MGMT. SCI. 583, 583-85, 596
(2003).
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prevailing against the defendant, where litigants have not fleshed out their
strategy or agreed on an overarching policy."' One way to harmonize
plans about achieving that end is to encourage cooperative activity. If liti-
gation is a shared cooperative activity, then litigants will tend to be mutu-
ally responsive to each other, committed to litigating together, and will
support one another in their shared efforts."17 Granted, there will be de-
grees of helpfulness, but even those who are less helpful do not destroy the
basic case of cooperative activity so long as they are minimally coopera-
tive, noncoercive, and noncompetitive."'
Take, for instance, a counterexample. Trichloroethylene spills around a
tannery and contaminates the city's groundwater; litigation ensues. You
plan to move away and want compensatory damages for your property's
diminished value and punitive damages for the company's wrongdoing. I
want to stay and think I might lose my tannery job if the company has to
pay excessive damages, but I do want the site cleaned up. We both know
this about one another and that neither is willing to compromise. The liti-
gation is not a shared cooperative activity; we both have plans concerning
the litigation, but those plans are not compatible.
Still, to require that we agree on a strategy or remedy to have a shared
cooperative activity is too strong a requirement.'19 It may be that our plans
dovetail on certain issues, but neither of us is willing to compromise to
maintain the compatibility.120 If, for instance, you want to hire a cutting-
edge environmental expert and I want to keep litigation costs manageable,
we might find an expert that satisfies both of us. Our activity could be co-
operative on this point even though our overall plans differ.' 2'
Examples abound where litigants sue the same defendant without in-
tending to do so cooperatively. The Vietnam veterans' organizations, in-
cluding Agent Orange Victims International, Citizen Soldier, and Vietnam
Veterans of America, offer an apt example. Described as "very effective in
small groups but not really capable of large-scale organization," the
groups divided ideologically.' 22 This division resulted in fractured organ-
izational and litigation efforts.'2 3 Peter Schuck indicates that each group
"differed from one another in terms of their leadership, competition for the
veterans' allegiance, geographical bases, political strategies, and views
116. See BRATMAN, supra note 112, at 121 ("For you and I to have a shared intention to J we need
not already have arrived at subplans that mesh."); BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 292.
117. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Cooperative Activity, in FACES OF INTENTION, supra note
104, at 94-95.
118. Id. at 104.
119. Id. at 98-99.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 98.
122. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 25-26 (1986).
123. Id. at 26.
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on the war."1 24 Their objectives and intentions clashed. Although the mem-
bers within the organizations might have shared commitments, intentions,
and goals, those goals conflicted and competed with other organizations.
Giving litigants an opportunity to cooperate with one another and to
reach agreement at least with respect to particular litigation activities, such
as establishing causation, can strengthen group cohesion. This might be
accomplished, for example, through judicially required plaintiffs-side me-
diation or group meetings conducted by a special officer.125 As litigants
cooperate on a particular activity, they might also decide to collaborate on
other litigation matters. Litigants might discover that group cohesiveness
and their normative story go hand in hand. Thus, by helping litigants figure
out what their ends are, and shifting from amorphous intentions to practical
goals, plaintiffs may realize that litigating in a group could lead to a better
result for them than striking out on their own.
iii. Shared Goals or Policies
Shared policies and goals help group members navigate disagreements
and frame individual deliberations, thereby bolstering consistency, coher-
ency, and stability.'2 6 Consensus among members about policies, values,
and ideals is a primary component of group cohesion.127 By providing a
background framework for deliberation, shared policies help litigants navi-
gate points that might otherwise cause the group to disband, such as set-
tlement offers. Shared policies might overlap with or lead to shared values,
which foster and reinforce the belief that together the group can advance its
common needs, priorities, and goals.' Still, a shared policy need not be
the exclusive policy. Claimants may value other objectives so long as the
shared policy defines the group and centers claimants' associated activities.
To illustrate, consider policies within the following examples from A
Civil Action, the Vioxx litigation, and the Holocaust litigation. Anne An-
derson in A Civil Action had a strong preference for apology-seeking and
public disclosure. She thought that W.R. Grace should apologize for con-
taminating the water in Woburn, Massachusetts, for causing her son's
leukemia, and ultimately for his death. 129 When faced with a settlement
124. Id. at 76.
125. Part III begins to explore these ideas.
126. BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 303.
127. Cota et al., supra note 60, at 577. "There is a significant positive relationship between cohe-
siveness and a community's influence on its members to conform. Thus, both conformity and commu-
nity influence on members indicate the strength of the bond." McMillan & Chavis, supra note 91, at
12.
128. McMillan & Chavis, supra note 91, at 13.
129. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 452 (1995). For additional information on attempts to
encourage apologies by excluding them as evidentiary admissions, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating
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offer that could divide the group of eight families, the group fell back on
this shared policy:
[I]t was [Richard] Toomey who spoke most forcefully. "A settle-
ment is one thing," he said, "but I'm not willing to throw out the
verdict in order to settle. They're guilty of polluting. My child died
from their stupidity. I didn't get into this for the money. I got into
this because I want to find them guilty for what they did. I want
the world to know that."
Most seemed to agree with this. Pasquale Zona said, "A settlement
without disclosure is no settlement at all."
It was Patricia Kane who, near the end, seemed to speak for eve-
ryone. "I think we'd all love to settle as long as we don't have to
compromise the verdict," she said. "I don't think it's a matter of
money. But we all want the jury's verdict to stand against
Grace."130
Similarly, the Merck Settlement Group formed to create a public forum
for voice opportunities and to educate litigants about Merck's offer to settle
the Vioxx litigation. The group's founder and moderator writes:
I started a group whose mission is to try to educate people cur-
rently involved in the settlement about what to expect from Merck,
and from their own lawyers. We are also trying to help people who
are just now being injured by other drugs. We are currently plan-
ning to set up a website that we hope will attract more attention
than these private groups. On this web site, we will post peo-
ples['] stories about their experiences with Merck, the Settle-
ment[,] and their lawyers. We will try to make people aware of
the different attorney fees, so they can shop around and not get
stuck with some unethical lawyer charging 40% plus expenses.
We will make them aware of the subrogation issues. We will let
them know that subrogation liens can be negotiated down. We will
give them links to different support groups and sources of medical
and legal information. We want to form alliances with other or-
ganizations who are trying to change the system and protect our
Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819 (2002); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and
Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460 (2003).
130. HARR, supra note 129, at 442-44.
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right to a jury trial, or if, as is the case with Vioxx, a jury trial i[s]
not practical, then at least have some safe guards set in place to en-
sure that the final settlement is equitable for all plaintiffs.131
Likewise, Roman Kent, who represented Holocaust survivors in the
German Foundation Initiative, observed a myriad of competing outside
interests-from class action attorneys to German businesses-while negoti-
ating with the German government and German industry for compensa-
tion.132 With the approval of the survivors on the negotiating team, Kent set
forth two nonnegotiable conditions:
1. There must be a full and sincere apology on the part of German
government and German industry for the crimes they committed
during the Holocaust.
2. Slave and forced laborers will be referred to only by name; un-
der no circumstances will they be denoted by numbers as we were
referred to in the concentration camps.13
These conditions guided Kent's negotiations on behalf of Jewish slave
labor. Each survivor on the negotiating team intended to give weight to
those conditions in their shared deliberations and mutually depended on
others to do the same.134 But, these overarching conditions extended only to
Kent's particular subgroup and did little to alleviate the factions existing
between that group and Eastern European countries. Those countries nego-
tiated on behalf of forced laborers whereas Kent's group represented slave
laborers.' 35 Accordingly, conflict arose when it came time to allocate mon-
ey between the two.136 Despite the existence of a common foe-Germany
and German industry-factions formed within the large plurality in part
because the entire group did not share a common policy covering or guid-
ing allocation principles.'3 7
In sum, individuals might share intentions about a particular action
where they bargain or negotiate about the best means to accomplish an
131. E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 20, 2008, 01:22
EST) (on file with author).
132. Roman Kent, It's Not about the Money: A Survivor's Perspective on the German Foundation
Initiative, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 205, 205-
07 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
133. Id. at 207. The point here is not to say that Germany or German businesses might refuse to
include these conditions in any settlement agreement, but that groups develop these types of governing
guidelines routinely to help direct bargaining.
134. See BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 304.
135. Kent, supra note 132, at 206.
136. Id. at 207.
137. Subgroups and group dispersion is discussed below. Infra Part II.B and Part III.C.
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end. In so doing, they commit to accomplish that end together. But these
individuals might have different ideas about what weight or significance to
afford to particular rationales when facing litigation decisions, thereby
causing the group to splinter. It is equally possible, however, that groups
will remain cohesive despite hard decisions if they engage in shared coop-
erative activities or have analogous policies about the significance or
weight to attach to a particular consideration. These groups would be more
cohesive. Still, these rough notations about group structuring represent a
range of interconnected human activities with varying degrees of overlap
and flexibility. As explored in Part III, the voluntary commitments and
intentions considered here form the basis for creating obligations to other
group members. Of course, because every group is different, the nature
and content of an obligation is highly context dependent.
3. Large-Scale Groups
Thus far, the implicit focus has been on smaller groups and subgroups
within litigation. But, theoretically, people in larger groups who engage in
common enterprises could also be plural subjects. 138 Extending these ideas
beyond personal face-to-face interactions and smaller groups (like the eight
families within A Civil Action) to larger ones (such as Vioxx) raises the
question of whether it is possible to share intentions without actually know-
ing that you are doing so. For instance, could 49,000 Vioxx litigants share
intentions or would their individual intentions merely overlap? That is, are
litigants merely an aggregate of individuals, or are they a social group? It
is possible for litigants in large-scale collective litigation to form a social
group, perhaps even one that shares ideas, intentions, goals, and policies.
It is equally plausible, however, that the group identity will exist at such an
abstract level that it is too shallow, unstable, or fragile to hold in the face
of hard cases, such as agreeing on a compensation grid.
Construing aggregate litigants as social groups, and social groups as
plural subjects, and plural subject theory as a theory of political obligation
may extend the analogy too far.' 39 Yet, the large-scale nature of some mass
torts, such as Vioxx, Agent Orange, and asbestos, shares key characteris-
tics with plural societies: smaller plural subjects exist within the mem-
138. MARGARET GILBERT, supra note 90, at 180; Kutz, supra note 83, at 2 ("Highly interdependent
cooperative activity does play an important role in our social lives. But so do the pedestrian but none-
theless genuine forms of collective action that we see in broader or more attenuated social contexts,
such as voting, working in large organizations, supplying capital for risky ventures-collective acts
typical of the consolidated yet simultaneously highly individualized circumstances of modernity.").
139. Admittedly, recasting aggregation in terms of political statehood is an imperfect analogy;
litigation is temporary and lacks the long-term gains that government affords. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 68. Still, many prominent authors
have aptly made this analogy. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of
Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 337, 337-40.
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bership; not all members know one another, making the groups impersonal
and anonymous; and members develop hierarchical structures." Initiating
litigation after the Buffalo Creek disaster explicitly mirrored a polity in
some respects. The community came together to elect a committee and a
chairman and the chairman then selected and recommended legal coun-
sel.141 Moreover, the American Law Institute has proposed that collective
decision-making by a majority vote of the claimants should bind all claim-
ants. 4 2 This means that broad agreement can be used to "cram down the
claims" despite minority dissent, much like a democratic majority.143
One difficulty with large-scale groups, as in the Vioxx litigation, is that
it is unlikely that everyone within that group knows one another. But peo-
ple need not expressly know one another to form a social group.1" Claim-
ants in large-scale litigation might still comprise a social group based upon
fundamental features of inclusiveness, despite impersonality and anonym-
ity. Large-scale mass torts are inclusive in the sense that smaller subgroups
form within the aggregation. For instance, the moderator of the Merck
Settlement Group writes:
The group has resulted in about four spin off groups that consist of
people who want to take some form of action to try to help other
people who are in, or soon will be in the same situation. We have
two groups whose goal is to take legal action to force Merck
and/or the system to change the current settlement to be more equi-
table. We have another group that is working with people who
have been (and are still being) injured by prescription drugs. It is
the goal of this last group to let people know what we have learned
about the legal system and what they may expect if they decide to
take their cases to court.145
140. See GILBERT, supra note 90, at 173-80.
141. STERN, supra note 95, at 6-9.
142. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17(b) (Prelim. Draft No. 5, 2008); e.g.,
In re Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d 190, 245 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) (2000) (providing for a 75% approval requirement in the asbestos bankrupt-
cies).
143. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1289505; See Issacharoff, supra note 139,
337-40.
144. For example, studies have been performed on online communities such as MySpace and Live-
Journal that demonstrate how these networks attract members, growth, and change within the commu-
nity. See Lars Backstrom et al., Group Formation in Large Social Networks: Membership, Growth, and
Evolution, International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (2006), available at
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id= 1150402.1150412 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
145. E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 18, 2008, 14:22
EST) (on file with author).
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In addition to including subgroups, a large social group is usually im-
personal. The members may not know one another but may have limited
contact through message boards, attorneys, or e-mails. Or they may be
completely anonymous to each other. For aggregate litigants to form a plu-
ral subject when they do not know one another, they must demonstrate a
readiness to be intentionally committed to the others, known or unknown,
on the plaintiffs' side of the litigation-the members. Thus, each litigant
manifests a quasi-readiness to share in an action such that they are all ready
under the proper circumstances." For instance, a settlement offer might be
a catalyst: if group members generally agreed that they would settle only if
the offer included withdrawing the offending drug from the market and the
offer lacked such a provision, then all would be ready to reject the offer.
This intention is commonly known among them in a very abstract way. 147
These groups fluctuate significantly throughout the litigation, coalesce
during certain litigation points, such as proving common causation, and
might even splinter into other interest subgroups. So even though an over-
arching common knowledge provides the glue to characterize litigants
within large-scale litigation as a social group, that glue is not necessarily
durable. Put differently, a group that shares only an intention to litigate
will ordinarily lack the depth, stability, and specificity to direct action in
the face of hard cases. This point becomes clearer by emphasizing that
plural subjects can exist with regard to smaller matters within the litiga-
tion. Although it might be helpful conceptually for these beliefs and inten-
tions to apply to the litigation as a whole (in some respects), it is less plau-
sible though not impossible. More likely, particular subgroups will coa-
lesce and develop a shared policy, or plaintiffs as a whole will jointly
value, believe, or intend something with regard to a particular issue within
the litigation.
B. Group Instability
As the Merck Settlement Group demonstrates, group cohesion may fall
prey to disruptive forces. It might be that the relative interdependence was
not present to begin with, that this interdependence did not bring to bear a
mutual obligation of the sort that prevents litigants from opting out, or the
initial shared framework was too shallow to sustain shared agency when
divisive issues arose. Outliers with similar claims against the same defen-
146. MARGARET GILBERT, Social Groups: A Simmelian View, in ON SOCIAL FACTS 146, 204-05
(1989). Christopher Kutz offers a less metaphysically obscure account than Gilbert by positing, "jointly
intentional action is fundamentally the action of individuals who intend to play a part in producing a
group outcome." Kutz, supra note 83, at 16. Despite his minimalist account, he acknowledges that
further conditions are necessary for groups to intentionally engage in a joint activity. Id. at 16-17. His
account has not been extended to ideas about obligation, thus it is not discussed at length here.
147. GILBERT, supra note 90, at 177 (defining common knowledge and using it in a similar way).
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dant may refuse to join the group (and rightly so if the proposed settlement
treats them unfairly). Or group members might all agree to rescind their
commitment and forgo their common goals. 148 It might even be that coming
together forces an otherwise innocuous issue to the surface, causing the
group to splinter. Whatever the cause, groups may fragment or never form
at all. This Subpart briefly introduces these problems.
Not all litigants within large-scale litigation consider themselves group
members; some are outliers. As I have indicated elsewhere, "individuals-
within-the-collective" tend to perceive litigation goals from a self-interested
vantage point and have their own prior intentions, aspirations, desires, and
plans about the litigation. 149 Yet they might reconsider or amend their strat-
egy when their initial reasons for initiating solo litigation are either no
longer in force or no longer sufficiently justify the original plan.so For
example, the individual-within-the-collective might be aggregated involun-
tarily through a multidistrict transfer and consolidation under Rule 42, but
eventually might determine that joinder is worth the cost of autonomy be-
cause it helps her establish a credible threat. 5' But she might not.
Alternatively, even when individuals do not commit to litigate together,
they may have egocentric interests that align, overlap, and coalesce, such
as establishing causation and maximizing the total recovery152 To illus-
trate, again consider going to a movie. We might both want to see the same
movie, either for similar or different reasons. That does not mean that we
want to see the movie together. We might not even know one another. If
neither of us knows that the other is going to the movie, if it is a coinci-
dence in other words, we do not plan to see the movie together.' 53 The
same idea holds true for plaintiffs. Common knowledge is the catalyst.
Individuals with "egocentric overlap" share partial litigation unity, but
148. GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation, supra note 105, at 142-43.
149. Burch, supra note 11, at 20-24; see also BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 284-85; Kwok Leung,
Kwok-Kit Tong, & E. Allan Lind, Realpolitik Versus Fair Process: Moderating Effects of Group Iden-
tification on Acceptance of Political Decisions, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 476, 477 (2007);
Tuomela, supra note 104, at 37-38. For more on intentions and plans of individual agents, see
BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 14-49.
150. See BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 289.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (multidistrict litigation transfer); FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a). In single
event accidents where more than 75 people died at a discrete location, consolidation might also be
accomplished through the Multiparty Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
These individuals have been called "kidnapped riders." See Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice,
Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 821-22
(1995).
152. I have previously defined what I mean by "egocentric overlap." Burch, supra note 11, at 16-
17.
153. See Bratman, Shared, supra note 105, at 98; Kutz, supra note 83, at 5 ("Jointly acting indi-
viduals do not merely act in parallel: each responds to what the others do and plan to do."); Raimo
Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller, We-Intentions, 53 PHIL. STUD. 367, 375 (1988).
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because they do not realize they want the same things, problems of knowl-
edge, stability, and depth can arise.'54
Different still, the court may subdivide a large litigation group based
on similar circumstances. For instance, in the Zyprexa litigation, the mag-
istrate court judge partitioned the plaintiffs into thirty subgroups by multi-
plying three treatment groups by ten different medications.' This division
could cut across lines of previous alliances and spur new groups.
Suffice it to say that there are multiple reasons that the individuals
within aggregate litigation would not consider themselves group members.
Although they might not categorize themselves as members of an overarch-
ing litigation group, they might connect with a subset of litigants sharing
the same values, commitments, or beliefs. Group theory has progressed
away from Aristotelian notions about "all or none" group structures and
toward belief clusters that form around prototypes of salient attributes. 156
This facilitates the development of subgroups, which may compete with the
overarching plaintiff group or with one another."
Because of its size, subgroup formation is inherently more likely in
large-scale litigation. The Vioxx litigation is a clear example. The Merck
Settlement Group, a subgroup of roughly 500 of some 49,000 Vioxx plain-
tiffs, experienced initial homogeneity, dissonance, and subsequent reorder-
ing:
In the first months, we were all united in our efforts to study and
understand the [Vioxx] settlement.... As time went on, some of
us wanted to continue to fight the settlement in the courts. Others
began to realize that the settlement was not only the product of
Merck's legal department, but was also a fulfillment of the agenda
that had been set in motion by the Bush administration. These dif-
ferent attitudes led to a split in the group and the formation of three
other groups.15 1
If subgroups form, they will likely have blurred boundaries with some
group members being more prototypical than others. Members may belong
154. Bratman, Dynamics, supra note 104, at 5.
155. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 4890588, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27,
2008).
156. Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi & Alain Cl6mence, Group Processes and the Construction of Social
Representations, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES supra note
59, at 311, 321; Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION (E.
Rosch & B.B. Lloyd eds., 1981).
157. See Michael A. Hogg, Social Categorization, Depersonalization, and Group Behavior, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 56, 71.
158. E-mail from Al Pennington, Moderator of the Merck Settlement Group, to Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 20, 2008, 01:22
EST) (on file with author).
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to multiple subgroups. This leaves open the very real likelihood of dis-
unity, dispersion, and competition.
III. MITIGATING DISUNITY, MITIGATING DILEMMAS
Thus far, this Article has considered the challenges that nonclass ag-
gregation presents, claimed that plaintiffs can form a plural subject by
sharing values, intentions, beliefs, desires, or goals, and observed that de-
spite those shared traits, group dispersion and instability may result. It has
also contended that certain obligations may follow from that group mem-
bership. This Part considers the content of those obligations and suggests
methods for strengthening group cohesion.
Recall that there are many types of plural subjects and that the nature
and content of the duties and obligations that flow from membership in that
group depend largely on the group itself. For instance, in the tort example
concerning the car accident, the duty to rescue may be as simple as calling
for help. At the other extreme, in formal contracts, the parties cannot uni-
laterally rescind their agreement. They must fulfill the obligations specified
in the contract or risk breaching the agreement. In between these extremes
lie class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2). Class members cannot
opt out of their shared endeavor because doing so might lead to inconsis-
tent results or deplete the common fund such that some deserving claimants
would receive nothing.'"9 As the Fifth Circuit has noted, there is a "pre-
sumption of cohesiveness" that necessitates "enhanced procedural safe-
guards to protect the individual rights of class members."'" Even less obli-
gatorily, class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class have an opportunity to opt
out of membership.' They incur obligations to one another only if they
remain in the class.
But what about plaintiffs involved in nonclass aggregation-what are
their obligations to one another? On one hand, like parties to a contract,
they signed up to litigate with a particular attorney, filed a complaint, and
thereby "opted in." On the other hand, as pointed out in Part I, it is not
entirely clear what they have signed up for or what conflicts might arise
during litigation. So it may be that people signed onto a blank slate and
committed to something vague, such as suing a defendant, but did not
make any commitments to other plaintiffs.
This final Part explores this ambiguity and assesses the following ques-
tions: (1) what to do with the holdouts, the dissenters, those who join the
group but then want to exit; (2) what to do with the outliers, those who
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2), 23(c)(2), (3); see also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998).
160. Allison, 151 F.3d at 413.
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
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have never joined the group or considered themselves group members; and
(3) how to mitigate competition among subgroups. In framing the questions
this way, I assume (for now) that unity and group cohesion is a desirable
goal because people become concerned for others in the group rather than
just themselves. Accordingly, I leave open the question of whether non-
competition and collaboration might create negative externalities, such as
bringing less information to light, subverting minority dissent, or sharpen-
ing the ultimate legal arguments.
As to the holdouts, perhaps the offered settlement does not satisfy their
litigation goals. For example, the offered settlement may deny responsibil-
ity and maintain confidentiality contrary to one's valuing transparency and
public awareness. Or maybe the settlement amount is insufficient to cover
hospital bills and doctors' visits. Or the value of telling one's story before
a judge in a public hearing is more important than sweeping the incident
under the rug and accepting a payoff.
Whatever the reason for holding out, these individuals might not be
able to maintain their dissenting position in the face of strong encourage-
ment and pressure from the group, through conflict resolution or refram-
ing. The more controversial issues are whether holdouts and outliers must
become or remain group members, whether they are morally or politically
obligated to participate in and assent to the settlement, and whether the
judge or the group should be able to sanction them in some way. These are
not just philosophical questions-they fundamentally affect individuals'
legal rights and daily lives. Even from the perspective of a moral obliga-
tion, an outlier, the individual who lacks the requisite desire and intention
to commit to the group, cannot have her feet held to the fire; the others
have no right to enforce a commitment that never was.162
This Part thus advances three arguments to address holdouts, outliers,
and subgroup competition. First, it posits that moral obligations follow
from being a plural subject. This addresses the problem of group members
leaving the group or withholding consent to derail a fair settlement by in-
sisting on more for themselves. The Part begins by proposing a counterex-
ample: an aggregation, without more, that is constructed solely through
externally coercive measures, such as procedural rules or legal agree-
ments. While these methods might prove useful as a means for bringing
people together, those individuals lack the communal aspect that fosters
moral obligations. Instead, obligations in nonclass aggregation follow when
litigants jointly and voluntarily commit to perform some or all litiga-
tion activities together. But that commitment need not be as explicit as
162. See MARGARET GILBERT, Summary and Prospect, in A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION,
supra note 66, at 296 ("The parties to the joint commitment cannot allege that they have a right of joint
commitment to a hold-out's conformity to it. They must find a moral argument that entitles them to
pressure him to act accordingly.").
2009] 37
HeinOnline -- 61 Ala. L. Rev. 37 2009-2010
Alabama Law Review
saying, "I promise to litigate with you." Rather, it might be implicit or
tacit. Regardless, the coercive component is no longer external. Instead,
individuals feel internal pressure and group pressure to honor their com-
mitments.
The second normative idea focuses on fostering group cohesion in mass
litigation. This addresses the outliers and intragroup instability by promot-
ing cooperation through group deliberation and social norms. Recall the
earlier findings from cognitive social psychology that once people view one
another as group members, they tend to fundamentally change their ideas
about justice. They care not only about their own outcome but also about
the group's collective welfare. Once we recognize that plural subjects incur
moral obligations to one another, and that membership both increases co-
operation and changes decision-making about dilemmas, we want the judi-
cial system to encourage those prosocial behaviors. In so doing, the group
might both attract outliers into its membership and discourage its current
members from acting to the group's detriment.
Finally, the last Subpart draws on empirical studies from social psy-
chology to suggest methods for alleviating competition between subgroups.
It raises the possibility of using a special officer or mediator to act as a go-
between. If appropriate, the officer or mediator could then employ goal
transformation techniques to make the overarching "plaintiff" membership
category salient. Accordingly, the last Subpart previews that possibility and
recommends directions for future research.
A. Obligations
Underlying the discussion on plural subjects is the basic notion that ob-
ligations can come from membership in a group. The question becomes at
what point-socially, morally, and philosophically-does group member-
ship obligate the individuals contained within it? Put differently, when does
being a plural subject require something of its members? Clearer cases
include those where the group's members provide mutual assurances, or
promises, such that the parties' relationship bears out the obligation. Less
clear is whether claimants in nonclass aggregation are obligated to one
another as de facto members of that assembly. By members, I do not sim-
ply mean those who have filed their own claim against what turns out to be
the same defendant without any common knowledge of other litigants' exis-
tence. Rather, litigants must be more than imputed members that lack re-
ciprocity or any relationship with one another.
1. External Coercion
Before delving into group obligations, it is helpful to reevaluate the
current methods for forced aggregation and "cohesion." One can envision
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at least three types of coercion that might arise in the mass tort context.16 3
To illustrate, consider these scenarios. First, the attorney, Ann, convinces
Bob and Cathy to enter into an agreement with one another and perhaps
many others as part of Ann's retainer agreement. The agreement waives
client-client conflicts so Ann can represent them both. In one sense then,
this consent undermines any suggestion that agreement was coerced. But if
Ann is the only attorney with the resources to bring the case, and the op-
tion is collective litigation or no litigation, a hint of coercion is present.
Second, and slightly different, Ann and Defendant enter into settlement
negotiations. Ann tells Bob and Cathy (and others that she represents) that
they must accept the settlement offer or she can no longer represent them.
Again, this might be seen as consent in one respect but coercive in the
sense that Bob and Cathy's alternative options are severely limited. Third,
the judge might order transfer and consolidation of Bob and Cathy's case
with many other similar cases pending in a different district, thereby un-
dermining Ann's strategic forum selection and ability to best position her
clients. "
Focus on the first scenario. Contracts, at least in theory, provide a
convenient solution to holdouts and misallocation: they give everyone in-
volved a way to limit their options if others will limit theirs too, thereby
allowing each to enjoy cooperative gains. Consent might then suffice as a
private arrangement that, in the words of Sam Issacharoff, "overcome[s]
the disfunctionality of the formal procedural system."l 65 Contracts thus
seemingly make it rational for claimants to cooperate rather than defect.
Using contractual agreements, however, raises concerns about whether
consent can actually be informed and, as in the second scenario, whether
counsel's uniform recommendations are in each client's best interest. Intra-
claimant governance agreements-where plaintiffs contractually agree to
majority rule-are predicated on the notion of informed consent. " But
163. Coercion is, of course, a loaded term with many different meanings. See Robert Nozick,
Coercion, in SOCRATIC PUZZLES 15, 22 (1969). I use it here in its colloquial sense.
164. Transfer might be accomplished under the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(2006), or the transfer statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2006), while consoli-
dation could be accomplished under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).
165. See Issacharoff, supra note 143, at 219.
166. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17(b) (April 7, 2008 Draft). Advanced
waiver of conflicts of interest and full knowledge of others' settlement terms departs from standard
practice under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.8(g) (2004); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006); Nancy J. Moore,
The American Law Institute's Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients
Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 403-04 (2008). But see Charles
Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
733, 769-70 (1997) (arguing that the aggregate settlement rule should be amended to permit consent by
majority rule). Recent drafts of this proposal temper the coercive aspect with independent review and
fairness approval as well as disclosing all material element of the settlement to the claimants.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LMG. § 3.17(e) (November 2008 draft). The draft does not
specify who the independent reviewer is.
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the American Law Institute proposes that litigants enter into these waivers
at the outset of litigation as part of the attorney's retainer agreement.167
Most instances of disunity-be it conflicts between the attorney and the
client, feuding clients, or holdouts-arise after initiating litigation. Conse-
quently, informed consent at this early phase does not necessarily translate
into informed consent throughout the litigation. Plus, the initial decision to
sign an agreement may effectively be a Hobson's choice: the choice is not
between collective litigation or individual litigation but, because of its ex-
pense, between collective litigation and no litigation.16 This suggests that
an intraclient governance agreement could be quasi-coercive.
Now along with the first scenario, consider the second, where Ann
encourages Bob and Cathy to consent to the settlement offer or she will
have to withdraw from representing them. We could debate the ethics of
the arrangement, as some have done well already, 69 or we could point to
the standard literature on coerced agreements and obligations, which posits
that they are not binding."7 e But first evaluate an example from a different
context: Bob lives in a rural state where the only industry in town is a
poultry farm. He does not particularly relish plucking chickens, but he
works for the poultry farm because he has few other options.17 ' His limited
options do not undermine his agreement to work for the farm.' 72 Ann's
threat to withdraw from representing Bob and Cathy, where few other at-
torneys could represent them, is similar. Agreeing to a coercive settle-
ment offer does not necessarily undermine consent. In one respect, the
question becomes when does consent negate coercion? Although this ques-
tion is of interest, the debate that it engenders, one over the false dichot-
omy between consent and coercion, has been well traveled by political and
legal philosophers writing about social contract theory and hypothetical
consent. 73
167. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.17(b) (April 7, 2008 draft).
168. Burch, supra note 11, at 20.
169. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Vioxx Settlement Agreement and Some Problems in Legal
Ethics (Jan. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
170. E.g., L.C. Becker, Hard Choices are Not Enough, 67 VA. L. REV. 97, 100 (1981); H. Beran,
In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority, 87 ETHICS 267 (1977); Joseph
Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 126 (1981); A.J. Simmons, Consent, Free Choice,
and Dernocratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791, 812, 816 (1984).
171. This is based on a similar example by Margaret Gilbert. See MARGARET GILBERT, Objections
to Actual Contract Theory, in A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION, supra note 66, at 80 [hereinafter
GILBERT, Objections].
172. This idea is mirrored in contract doctrine on duress. If the duress is not caused by the other
party to the contract, then the party under duress must still fulfill her contractual obligations so long as
the other party acted in good faith and had no reason to know of her duress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981).
173. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690); JOSEPH TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC (1960); see also
Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 990 (1965); Hanna Pitkin, Obligation
and Consent-I, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39 (1966).
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Instead of heading down that path, contemplate these examples along
with the third scenario posed at the outset, where the judge transfers and
consolidates Bob and Cathy's case with many others like it. Each sce-
nario-the intraclaimant governance agreement, the withdrawal, and the
judicial maneuvering-seeks a mechanism to legitimize its coercive aspect.
People might fairly characterize that mechanism's legitimacy differently.
That difference largely depends on whether the person aims to maximize
welfare through governance arrangements, or to privilege consent since
these situations occur in the bowels of private ordering. But an alternative
exists.
2. Intragroup Obligations
Instead of asking how to legitimize an externally coercive force
through a falsely constructed community (intraclaimant agreements, threats
of withdrawal, or judicial coercion), imagine judicial procedures and attor-
neys representing many clients in a novel way, as a means for convening
litigants. And further envision that, as in medieval guilds, the legitimizing
force is the social glue within the plural subject. Put differently, what if in
lieu of external coercion we relied on internal group coercion, on the moral
obligations that individuals incur and the norms that they adhere to in the
course of social agglomeration?
For instance, contrast an assembly constructed and bound through a
formal agreement with an actual group that evolves organically through
relationships, commonalities, social networks, intentions, and assurances.
The constructed assembly-without more-lacks community and the indi-
viduals retain their self-interest. But members of an organically evolved
group may have moral obligations to one another, obligations to treat one
another fairly, to keep their promises, and to conform to other community
norms.
One might contend that individuals who intend to do the same thing
(whether they intend to do it together or not), whether it is litigating, going
to the movies, or walking, obligates everyone with that intention to per-
form that action together. Should one's actions fail to conform, the others
can demand action or admonish the rebel.174 According to this view, parties
who intend to achieve an end, whether their interests simply hap-
pen to overlap or they intended to achieve that end together, have rights
and obligations to each other." If one holds out or wants to exit the
174. See generally GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation, supra note 105, at 147-48 (discuss-
ing a different idea about joint commitments, not simply overlapping intentions); GILBERT, Objections,
supra note 171, at 53-54 (same).
175. See generally GILBERT, Joint Commitment and Obligation, supra note 105, at 149, 155, 161
(discussing a similar idea from the perspective of commitments); GILBERT, Objections, supra note 171,
at 56-57.
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group, the others have reason to complain even though there was no inten-
tion to perform that activity together at all.
If this seems conceptually unsound and inane, consider a Rule 23(b)(1)
limited fund class action or an equitable class action certified under Rule
23(b)(2). Neither procedural grouping permits those within its ranks to opt
out; there is no choice at all about the matter, whether one intends to liti-
gate or not.176 Cohesiveness is presumed, thereby eliminating the possibil-
ity of holdouts and outliers that make achieving the collective good in Rule
23(b)(3) and nonclass aggregation difficult."' Plus, in pattern-or-practice
employment cases, the defendant employer creates a preexisting commu-
nity-its employees." That grouping then frames the class definition and
the litigation's preclusive effects. Similarly, in a limited fund class action,
the group consists of a community of victims wronged by the same organi-
zation. The rationale for requiring these litigants to litigate together is that
multiple judges might reach inconsistent conclusions about equitable de-
crees, or litigants might deplete a limited fund before others could bring
their claims.179 But in rejecting a motion for class certification, the judge
has ruled that these dangers are not present. Thus, by definition, nonclass
aggregation cannot invoke these justifications to define its membership and
prevent plaintiffs from opting out. Accordingly, this view of obligation
seems too strong for nonclass aggregation.
One might also adopt a softer form of obligation, one that is grounded
in collective planning and anchors commitments through norms of stabil-
ity. Planning a group activity demands some stability, frequently garnered
through social pressure. Without stability, a group's members are less reli-
able, externalizing noncompliance costs on other members.8 o Rescinding
promises or changing plans thus violates these stabilizing norms. There-
fore, obligations arise "because shared intentions normally involve, both in
their etiology and in their execution, associated assurances, inten-
tionally induced reliance, and/or promises. Such assurances (and the like)
typically induce relevant moral obligations of one to the other."181 So, it is
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2), (c).
177. One might easily question the accuracy of this presumption. For instance, in the school deseg-
regation cases, clients often conflicted over bussing issues; some parents did not want their children
bussed to poor schools with a tradition of violence, whereas others thought desegregation was critical at
all costs. Both groups were often lumped together into a Rule 23(b)(2) class. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE L.J. 470, 482 (1976).
178. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 84 (2005) (describing the workplace as a community that forges
lasting bonds through somewhat involuntary workplace interactions).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2).
180. See BRATMAN, Shared Intention, supra note 104, at 110.
181. Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency, in PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL
THEORY AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE (Chris Mantzavinos, ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17),
available at http://philosophy.stanford.eduldownload/18458/BrannanSharedAgency_6_08.pdf.
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the promises and assurances that may arise in conjunction with planning a
group activity that obligate, not a coincidental decision to litigate. The
oversimplified difference is between saying: "I intend" versus "I prom-
ise." 8 2 Promises and mutual assurances include a moral standard that re-
quires fulfillment.' But promises need not be as explicit as saying, "I
promise." Rather, as the law of evidence illustrates, agreement might be
tacit or implicit depending on the context.
Of course, sometimes we might embed an exit mechanism within our
assurances.'"' You might say at the outset, "We will litigate together, but I
reserve the right to change my mind and you can too." Thus, to obligate,
these promises and assurances must not place conditions to the contrary."'
From this discussion, we might draw one of several conclusions about
whether an obligation exists in nonclass aggregation:
Case 1: When many litigants each intend to X, they are obligated
to one another to fulfill that intention together.
Illustration 1.a: Pyrotechnics ignite a fire in a nightclub killing 100
and injuring 200. Plaintiffs file both joint and individual claims.
Eventually, however, over 200 plaintiffs subscribe to a Master
Complaint, which lists each litigant individually but seeks damages
for negligence on behalf of all plaintiffs against several defendants.
The Master Complaint requests certain damages in death cases and
other damages for personal injuries.
182. See David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 29, 44
(1997) ("The utterance of 'I promise' commits the speaker by placing him under a socially defined
obligation. But intentions are psychological rather than social commitments. An utterance of 'I intend'
must commit the speaker in the sense of making him psychologically committed to action."). The idea
of a promise as an obligation similarly comports with H.L.A. Hart's "most obvious cases" of an obli-
gation. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 179, 183 (1955).
183. Of course, this moral duty is different from a legal duty. Although these moral standards
influenced contract law, promises in and of themselves are not legally enforceable. See generally
HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.2 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent The-
ory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 296 (1986) ("A moral obligation that is not also a valid legal
obligation can only be legitimately secured by voluntary means. That is, one may have a moral obliga-
tion to do something, but unless there is also a valid legal obligation, one cannot legitimately be forced
by another to do it.").
184. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (adoptive admissions).
185. BRATMAN, INTENTION, supra note 104, at 133.
186. Id. at 138-39; see also Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 72, 99 (1972); Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Prac-
tices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 199, 208 (1990).
187. This example is based on the 2003 fire that broke out at The Station, a Rhode Island nightclub,
during a concert given by the hard rock band Great White. The rough illustration does not implicate all
the facts of that case, but the Master Complaint and the court's intermittent decisions are available.
Complaint, Gray v. Derderian, 2006 WL 820151 (D.R.I. 2006) (No. 04-312); Gray v. Derderian, 400
F. Supp. 2d 415, 419-20 (D.R.I. 2005). Courts generally cite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) as
authorizing master complaints. E.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp. of N.Y., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir.
1975); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 133, 141 (E.D. La. 2002). A master
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Illustration 1.b: Diet drugs cause heart problems of varying de-
grees in users across the country. Some litigants retain the same at-
torney and initiate group litigation, others sue individually, but
each litigant intends to sue the drug's manufacturer.
Case 1 is problematic both practically and theoretically. If all litigants
initiate litigation against a particular defendant, as in Illustration 1.b, they
may have only an intention to litigate in common, particularly if applied to
large-scale litigation. There may be no joint commitment at all. Simply
intending to litigate against the same defendant might be nothing more than
mere egocentric overlap.'"' It would be a bit like saying that because
49,000 Vioxx plaintiffs each initiate litigation against Merck, they jointly
commit to suing Merck as a body. 189 That is not the case; initiating law-
suits-without more-does not evince any intention to be committed to one
another.
Even assuming a shared intent is present at some level, as in Illustra-
tion L.a., litigants may not have coordinated plans about how to fulfill that
intent. Filing a master complaint has several implications. Most often, it
means that the judge ordered plaintiffs to file the joint complaint or risk
dismissal (a semi-coercive element), and plaintiffs obliged. Still, plaintiffs
generally retain the right to control their cases individually because a mas-
ter complaint is not given the same effect as an ordinary complaint; it is
simply a procedural device.'" Consequently, there is some deliberate am-
biguity here as well.
Although individuals may each intend to sue the same defendant, they
might do so for different reasons and have contrasting objectives in mind.
Plaintiffs in Illustration L.a might each believe that defendants should be
held liable for the nightclub fire, but their rationales might differ or they
might believe that certain defendants are more culpable than others. Put
another way, when confronted with a new issue, such as whether to accept
or reject a settlement offer or its compensation plan, litigants in Illustra-
tion L.a might divide. They each intend to litigate and perhaps this inten-
tion is more specific than most, but that does not mean that they share an
complaint does not "merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make
those who are parties in one suit parties in another." In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. at
141 (quoting 9 Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2382 at 255
(1971)). Thus, courts use the device to achieve economy and efficiency. Diana E. Murphy, Unified and
Consolidated Complaints in Multidistnct Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 597, 597-98 (1991).
188. For a definition of egocentric overlap, see supra note 11.
189. Plaintiffs also filed a master complaint in the Vioxx litigation. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
239 F.R.D. 450, 453 (E.D. La. 2006).
190. Id. at 454; In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. at 141-43; Murphy, supra note
187, at 601-02. But see In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d
1069, 1078 (S.D. Ind. 2001) rev'd in part, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (using the Master Complaint
as well as the parties' agreement as a justification to apply the choice-of-law rules of its own forum).
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overarching policy or strategy. The intent, in this sense, is attenuated or
partial. Without promises, norms, and values as social glue, an intention is
not a commitment; the "group" is just as likely to fracture as it is to coa-
lesce when divisive issues arise.
One might also propose a third reading, based on Illustration 1.b, the
diet drug litigation. Illustration 1.b might be viewed as nonobligatory since
opting out of the endeavor in light of new developments could constitute
either mutual rescission or fulfillment. That is, even if the claim is that
abstract intentions obligate litigants to one another, those intentions do not
dictate further cooperation; intentions can be singular and abstract, they do
not mandate shared reasons. Stated simply, by litigating together initially,
plaintiffs have fulfilled their obligation-they initiated litigation together
and that was all they required of one another. The obligation is satisfied.
To continue to develop policies and goals would then be a new commit-
ment. An initial commitment might well lead to further related commit-
ments, but one cannot say that, without more, litigants must coordinate
plans or policies.
As explored shortly, bringing litigants together to deliberate and dis-
cuss their plans, goals, intentions, and desires facilitates an opportunity to
commit to one another and devise cooperative strategies and stabilizing
norms. Commitments, cooperation, and norms thereby deepen group cohe-
sion. But it assumes too much to contend that merely by intending to sue
the same defendant or being required to subscribe to a master complaint-
before discovery, before potential intraclient conflicts come to light, and
most significantly, before group norms evolve-plaintiffs obligate them-
selves to one another. Consequently, suffice it to say that Case 1 is too
ambiguous in important ways to morally obligate the plaintiffs.
Case 2: Litigants jointly and voluntarily intending X, who commit
to one another through promises or assurances, are obligated to act
in accordance with that intention provided no exit conditions to the
contrary exist.
Illustration 2: An attorney represents 100 plaintiffs in litigation
against a drug manufacturer. All claimants jointly and voluntarily
commit to suing the manufacturer. Although their injuries vary, af-
ter discussion, the clients agree that they want (1) the drug recalled
from the market, (2) to educate the public about its potential ef-
fects, and (3) to receive compensation for their injuries. During the
discussion, they promise and assure one another that they will not
settle for less, at least not without majority consensus.
This is one-though not the only-basic framework for a cohesive
group, where group membership morally binds its members. To explain,
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by jointly and voluntarily intending to X, litigants each have intentions in
favor of the designated activity and will thus function together in ways that
promote and further that intention.19' They might coalesce over certain
litigation components-causation, fault, or basic liability-but not others.
The danger in attenuated unity is that the framework might be too fragile to
hold. That initial harmony, however, may lead to collaboration on other
matters.
Sharing intentions regularly leads participants to conform to a norm of
compatibility and to develop cooperative strategies through bargaining or
adjusting.192 Yet, litigants need not share background reasons for participat-
ing in the litigation. Although the shared policies in Illustration 2 further
stabilize the group's commitment, the litigants might nevertheless have
different motivations: vengeance, apology-seeking, or public education
might underlie the commitment framework. In this sense, the shared intent
would be partial but would still form a collective framework.' Although
Case 2 includes a voluntary component, this component might still be satis-
fied after judicial transfer and consolidation or after an attorney retains
multiple clients, so long as it is the litigants' intent to engage in a shared
endeavor that catalyzes the relationship, not a third party's will.
Because intentions demand means-end coherence and include at least
some degree of resistance to reconsideration and change, people who share
intentions and desires regularly develop norms of consistency, agglomera-
tion, and stability.194 Once established, these norms guide behavior and,
when violated, others may appeal to the norm in their reasoning. But the
shared intention is not the binding force; it is the promises and assur-
ances-the commitment-made in the execution and etiology of group de-
velopment that morally obligate. Social norms about keeping and fulfilling
promises further reinforce the obligation while stabilizing the intention.
Notice that this case excludes individuals-within-the-collective and
those with only egocentric overlap. By definition, individuals within these
categories have either distinctly eschewed shared agency, remained agnos-
tic, or are simply ignorant of others involved. They are outside the group
as I have defined it. Thus, binding them through notions of shared agency
and obligating them to a cadre of disaggregated individuals has no moral
force. There is no agency, no group, and no commitment. This does not
mean that they can never incur obligations to one another. On the cont-
rary, exposure, cooperation, and deliberation could catalyze commit-
ments.
191. See Bratman, supra note 181, at 14.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Id. at 16.
194. Id. at 4-5.
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These cases illustrate when litigants are morally obligated to one an-
other to carry out the group's intentional activity. Case 2 does not conclude
how substantive laws should reinforce these obligations. It explains when
group members ought to be obligated to one another. It might be, as ex-
plored below, that judicially created opportunities for people to come to-
gether, explore commonalities, and ultimately make promises and assur-
ances to one another would be enough. Or, it might be that the law should
bind individuals together once they are morally obligated to one another
and a certain level of moral interconnectedness exists. This Article focuses
on the first possibility-creating opportunities for plaintiffs to morally obli-
gate themselves to one another-but does not intend to foreclose the possi-
bility of using law in this way.
An interesting observation, which is outside this Article's purview, is
that there are instances in which the law compels more than what morality
and practicality-through the construction of norms and plans-require.
For example, contract law does not enforce mere promises.' But in some
respects, procedure has done what substantive law has not. Judge Weins-
tein, for example, strongly-arguably coercively-encouraged plaintiffs to
agree to the Zyprexa settlement and thereby accomplished unity through
back-end consent.19 6 It stands to reason that legal and moral obligations are
not congruent. For present purposes, however, I return to the idea that
under the circumstances just described, group members within nonclass
aggregation are morally obligated to one another to fulfill their commit-
ments.
B. Cooperative Alternatives
So far, this Article has sketched a novel claimant-centered approach to
"groups" within nonclass aggregation and taken a normative position on
when membership ought to obligate those within its ranks. But the artificial
cleanness of this theoretical position becomes apparent when translated into
reality. Problems of pinpointing litigants' fluctuating mindsets and inten-
tions, of pigeonholing litigants at all, and of enforcing amorphous com-
mitments all arise. Perhaps these problems raise the question of why it
195. See supra note 172.
196. Judge Weinstein ordered all plaintiffs to file their claims by a certain date to fulfill the settle-
ment's 86% participation rate and thereby prevent Eli Lilly from walking away. To further induce
claimants, he held:
Any plaintiff who fails to comply-either by submitting an inadequately supported claim, or
by failing to submit necessary documents-will be deemed to have abandoned the claim; the
complaint will be dismissed with prejudice and the case reinstated only upon submission of
affidavits showing good cause for the delay and a substantial basis for the renewed claim.
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Peter Schuck describes
this same pressure in Judge Weinstein's handling of the Agent Orange litigation. SCHUCK, supra note
122, at 143-67.
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matters that the approach is right if it is not easily translatable, if it at first
seems impracticable or even improbable. Consider two points in response.
First, if the theory itself is neglected or assumed, there is little hope of
stumbling upon appropriate practices. Second, as I have explored else-
where in detail, voluntary compliance with the law hinges on systemic le-
gitimacy.' 9 This legitimacy requires reasoned justifications and transparent
process. So it is plausible that one might agree on the theoretical frame-
work for generating obligations and perhaps upon when internal coercion is
appropriate, but disagree with implementation methods. The techniques
that follow are thus preliminary observations that will inevitably require
some adjustment.'98 Nevertheless, they can ignite the debate and begin con-
structing a psychological foundation for fostering cooperation among plain-
tiffs.
This Subpart considers how the system might foster group cohesion,
thereby enticing outliers into its ranks and making holdouts less likely.
Specifically, it explains the social psychology underlying group identity
and offers a few nascent proposals for moving from theory to practice.'"
These include shifting plaintiffs' attorneys' role from litigation architects to
facilitators, using special officers to promote goal identification and medi-
ate differences among subgroup members on the plaintiffs' side, and using
intraclaimant governance agreements to memorialize those goals and out-
line group decision-making procedures.
1. Group Deliberation
One of the most robust findings in the social psychology literature is
that when a group discusses a dilemma, they are substantially more likely
to cooperate with one another.2" Discussion increases cooperation by elic-
iting social norms (such as promise-keeping, compatibility, social agglom-
eration, nonabandonment, and means-end coherence) and provides a plat-
form for a leader (an attorney or special officer, perhaps) to lend salience
to the relevant norm. 2 1 When people face a new situation, such as litiga-
197. Burch, supra note 11, at 6-11; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA 's Impact on Litigation as a
Public Good, 29 CARDoZO L. REv. 2517, 2533-36 (2007); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class
Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REv. 63, 106-11 (2008).
198. For instance, this claimant-centered view may affect the apportioning of attorneys' fees. Given
space constraints, however, I leave these issues for future work.
199. As Richard Nagareda points out, the bigger question is how the law night create incentives for
plaintiffs' attorneys to facilitate cooperation. Although this Article is able only to touch on these ideas
due to space constraints, I intend to fully address this question and develop these ideas in future work.
200. E.g., Bicchieri, supra note 91, at 193; Peter Kollock, Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Coop-
eration, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 183, 194 (1998); Win B. G. Liebrand, The Effect of Social Motives,
Communication and Group Size on Behaviour in an N-person Multi-stage Mixed-motive Game, 14 EUR.
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 239, 251-52 (1984).
201. Bicchieri, supra note 91, at 193, 220; Bratman, supra note 181, at 8-10. The psychology
literature on social dilemmas divides over these two theories, with some positing that discussing the
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tion, they frequently rely on each other for interpretation clues and schema
suggestions to make the peculiar familiar and relevant.2 02 Invoking social
norms satisfies this desire for familiarity.
When group members discuss a problem, they are increasingly likely
to polarize and conform to the polarized norm if: (1) they categorize them-
selves as a member of the plaintiff group (or subgroup); and (2) there are
prototypical characteristics, behaviors, and group norms that distinguish
that group from others .203 This latter criterion might be either differentiat-
ing the plaintiffs' group from the defendant, or one plaintiff group from
another based on overarching objectives or injuries. Each criterion defines
one group in contrast to another within the specific litigation context.
Leaders thus become instrumental. They interpret and translate the situa-
tion as well as invoke the appropriate social norm: cooperating is "the right
thing to do," one should "stick to their promises," or "we should defect
and opt out."204 These norms then become the group norm, increasing the
group's cohesiveness.
The norm invoked depends on the stage of group cohesion: if the group
is in its formative stage, then individuals must develop their joint goals and
commitments through discussion. They might decide, as in Illustration 2,
on an overarching litigation policy of seeking drug recall and patient edu-
cation (as well as compensation). If so, then they will likely elicit the req-
uisite mutual assurances and promises from one another to sustain and ful-
fill those goals. Once this occurs, members can appeal to norms of com-
patibility, social agglomeration, promise-keeping, and the desire for
means-end coherence and consistency in subsequent discussions. These
norms rationally pressure litigants to take whatever steps necessary to fur-
ther their role in the group's joint activity. 205 Thus, norms and intentional
interconnection are the social glue keeping the group together even absent
a legally binding contractual agreement.20 6
Leaders enhance their influence and further promote cooperation by
ensuring procedural fairness. 2 1 Prototypical group members-those who
dilemma enhances group identity, while others argue that discussing the dilemma elicits social norms.
For citations to the former theory, see Robyn Dawes, John M. Orbell & Alphons van de Kragt, Not Me
or Thee But We: The Importance of Group Identity in Eliciting Cooperation in Dilemma Situations:
Experimental Manipulations, 68 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 83, 83-97 (1988). For citations to the latter
theory, see Bicchieri, supra note 91.
202. See Bicchieri, supra note 91, at 220-21.
203. Cooper, Kelly & Weaver, supra note 59, at 260. Margaret Gilbert argues that three character-
istics are necessary for a social group: "intentionality of membership, unity, and consciousness of
unity." MARGARET GILBERT, Social Groups: Starting Small, in A POLITICAL THEORY OF OBLIGATION,
supra note 66, at 96.
204. Bicchieri, supra note 91, at 193.
205. See Bratman, supra note 181, at 10.
206. See id. at 15.
207. David De Cremer & Daan van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The
Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858, 859 (2002).
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are central to the group-care more about justice, and hence more about
allocation issues, than do marginal members or individuals-within-the-
collective.208 The defining characteristic for achieving fairness among
group members is the procedure used to allocate; group members perceive
procedures as manifestations of the group's underlying values. 2' Thus,
how a procedure treats any given member indicates that person's status
within the group. Fair procedures increase prosocial behavior, strengthen
group commitment, discourage opting out or leaving the group, and en-
hance the group's authority and legitimacy.210 In short, if the group agrees
on (and develops) fair procedures for decision-making, members are more
likely to cooperate and agree on allocating resources, resolving conflicts,
and addressing other group problems.21' Studies about allocating goods, for
instance, indicate that giving participants an opportunity to voice their opi-
nions about the allocation process fosters belonging and cooperation.2 12
Framing similarly affects cooperation in common-pool dilemmas by
changing the reference point. For instance, suggesting that participants
were taking something ("doing bad") belonging to the group encouraged
more cooperation than simply suggesting that participants were "not doing
good," since doing harm is a greater moral fault.2 13 Similar empirical stud-
ies found that people with more prosocial orientations, those placing
greater value in the collective, cooperate more if the potential outcome is
framed as a loss.214 Those with less social tendencies, who place greater
weight on their own outcomes, cooperate more if the outcome is framed in
terms of a gain.215 Generally translated into group-oriented mindsets, this
208. Tyler & Lind, supra note 57, at 93-94. I have defined the term "individual-within-the-
collective" in a previous article. Burch, supra note 11, at 20-24.
209. Tyler & Lind, supra note 57, at 87. Tyler and Lind note that social exchange models and
group-value models differ over the best way to promote intergroup cooperation. Social exchange mod-
els focus on building group interdependence and convincing the group members that both groups con-
tribute to the common good. Group-value theory, on the other hand, posits that conflict can be dimin-
ished by convincing members of both groups that they all belong to an overarching social category. Id.
at 92.
210. ToM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 79 (2000) (citing numerous studies supporting
these conclusions).
211. Id. at 77; Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 137, 148 (2000).
212. David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing Group Behavior: The Interplay Between Proce-
dural Justice, Sense of Self, and Cooperation, 37 ADVANCES EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 181 (2005).
213. Eric van Dijk & Henk Wilke, Is it Mine or is it Ours?: Framing Property Rights and Decision
Making in Social Dilemmas, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 195, 195-
209 (1997); see also Nobert L. Kerr & Ernest S. Park, Group Performance in Collaborative and Social
Dilemma Tasks: Progress and Prospects, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP
PROCESSES, supra note 59, at 107, 118.
214. Carsten K. W. de Dreu & Christopher McCusker, Gain-Loss Frames and Cooperation in Two-
Person Social Dilemmas: A Transformational Analysis, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1093,
1093-1106 (1997).
215. Id. at 1-11; see also Kerr & Park, supra note 213, at 116.
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suggests that those functioning predominately as prosocial, group-oriented
individuals, such as those jointly committed, are more likely to cooperate
when an undesirable result (rejecting a fair settlement) is framed as a loss.
Individuals-within-the-collective, on the other hand, may cooperate more if
the desired choice is framed as a gain.
2. Mutual Assurances
Beyond surface-level framing effects, mutual assurances that group
members will remain faithful to their obligations similarly enhance group
stability. 2 16 Mutual assurances might precede and define joint commit-
ments, as when neighbors join together to litigate groundwater contamina-
tion, or the litigation itself might bring people together and lead to a com-
mitment.2 17 Most evidence suggests that increased cooperation correlates
with commitments and promises made during group discussion.218 More-
over, discussing the dilemma itself raises concern and awareness for fellow
group members; the personal norms associated with promising tend to
compel people to follow through with their commitments regardless of
whether others will find out. 219
Perhaps surprisingly, this phenomenon persists in one-shot interactions
where group exposure is minimal. This is usually the case in large-scale
litigation. With discussion and group interaction, commitments and prom-
ises made in one-shot interactions, even where anonymity is assured, are
not just "cheap talk." 220 Even though temptation to defect is great, the de-
fault presumption in newly formed groups is toward cooperation and trust,
not betrayal. 221 This result, seen in empirical studies on both large
216. See BRATMAN, Shared Intention, supra note 104, at 139; Bratnan, Dynamics, supra note 104,
at 10-11.
217. Bratman, supra note 104, at 10-11; MARGARET GILBERT, Reconsidering Actual Contract
Theory, in A POLITICAL THEORY OF OBLIGATION, supra note 66, at 217 ("[M]aking an agreement is a
way of producing a joint commitment. It implies, further, that the obligations to which agreements give
rise are (at least) obligations of joint commitment.").
218. Kelly S. Bouas & Samual S. Komorita, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilem-
mas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144-50 (1996); Norbert L. Kerr & Cindi M. Kauf-
man-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 48 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 349-63 (1994).
219. Bouas & Komorita, supra note 218, at 1144-50; Norbert L. Kerr et al., That Still, Small
Voice: Commitment to Cooperate as an Internalized Versus a Social Norm, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300, 1300-11 (1997).
220. 1 intend "cheap talk" in the psychological and philosophical sense as opposed to the economic
sense. For an overview of the distinction, see David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58, 87 (1995).
221. Bicchieri, supra note 91, at 203-04. Bicchieri's rationale is that "interpreting a situation as 'us'
versus 'them', as it frequently occurs even in the minimal group paradigm . . . , may activate interac-
tive schemata that contain norms such as 'take care of one's own', which could explain the preferential
treatment accorded to ingroup members." Id. at 218 (emphasis omitted).
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22and small groups, is most likely the result of exchanging promises.
Promise keeping triggers an injunctive default norm: one has a moral obli-
gation to follow through with commitments.223
Still, binding pledges to cooperate-such as a contract-further en-
hance cooperation. 224 This suggests a place for an intraclaimant govern-
ance agreement, but not as part of an ex ante retainer-based contract.
Rather, it should memorialize promises elicited as the result of communica-
tion, compromise, and assurances, not impose obligations based on an ex-
ternally constructed assembly. This necessitates further research on how
sanctions and punishment might affect cooperation and compliance. As a
preliminary example, however, in the related context of securities class
actions, some courts permit groups of unrelated investors to join together
to become the lead plaintiff. To do so, the group must establish that it can
function cohesively and effectively, produce plans for cooperation, and
"evince[] an ability (and a desire) to work collectively to manage the liti-
gation." 226 If the group successfully demonstrates these cooperative aspects
to the court, then the court formally allows the group to represent the
class.
Approaching hard cases within a group will be less polarizing if the
shared framework is deepened. For instance, if all litigants agree in ad-
vance about a shared policy-to have the offending product recalled, for
example-the question of whether to accept a settlement that contains a
confidentiality provision and allows continued product marketing will be
less divisive. So long as deliberation and consensus defined product recall
222. Id.
223. Id. at 215. Some suggest that this might also be the result of consensus building, but other
research demonstrates that consensus alone does not increase cooperation. Id.
224. Xiao-ping Chen & S.S. Komorita, The Effects of Communication and Commitment in a Public
Goods Social Dilemma, 60 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 367, 367-86
(1994).
225. For preliminary sources that develop this aspect, see James Andreoni, William Harbaugh &
Lise Vesterlund, The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM. ECON.
REv. 893, 893-902 (2003); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation,
211 ScI. 1390, 1390-96 (1981); Olivier Bochet, Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, Communication and
Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11, 11-26 (2006);
Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 63, 63-87 (2004); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 980, 980-94 (2000); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Altruistic Pun-
ishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137, 137-40 (2002); Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter,
Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms, 13 HUM. NATURE 1, 1-
25 (2002).
226. Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (quoting Reimer v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc., 2008 WL 2073931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2008)); see also Freudenberg v. E-Trade Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 2876373, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2008); In re Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc., 2006 WL 2380965, at *1 (D. Utah Aug. 16, 2006) (sub-
mitting affidavits to confirm the group's cooperative efforts).
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as the goal that mattered, mutual assurances could foster obligations to
follow that policy27
On the other hand, if you and I enter into litigation and you want to en-
sure that the defendant recalls its product, but I want the maximum amount
of money to compensate me for my hospital bills, then we might both seek
to deepen our shared understanding to better weigh the policies underlying
our deliberation. Although you might not care about money and I might be
principally concerned with compensation, we might reach some alternative
understanding that we would both agree to a settlement with compensation
and no product recall, but also no confidentiality.228 This creates the possi-
bility that the relevant federal or state agency would reconsider the prod-
uct's consumer safety. So, we are leaving open the relative weight to attach
to each reason such that we might reach agreement.22 9
It is through deliberation and assurances that litigants with individual-
within-the-collective mindsets or egocentric overlap might gain common
knowledge, deepen sharing, and generate reciprocal obligations.230 Accord-
ingly, even when cooperation is not present initially, litigants can generate
shared agency through mutually assuring one another that they will not opt
out.231 They need not converge their normative beliefs or judgments, which
in many cases might prove impossible. Rather, litigants giving shared
weight to inherently different goals might still achieve consensus and satis-
faction with the litigation's outcome. Consequently, increasing group sta-
bility through shared or alternative weighting allows for plurality within
litigation groups. We should thus consider how the judicial system might
facilitate discussion among plaintiffs and how we might incentivize plain-
tiffs' attorneys to create these opportunities for their clients.
C. Minimizing Subgroup Competition
Bringing litigants together could exacerbate conflicts that might not
have arisen otherwise. As mentioned, the overarching group might share
an interest in establishing causation against the defendant but might polar-
ize over the appropriate remedy. The subgroup leader might then invoke an
exit-based norm. Thus, at some point, competing groups in large-scale
litigation either need to connect or the litigation clusters need to be small-
227. See BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 285; Bratman, Dynamics, supra note 104, at 10-11.
228. See Bratman, Dynamics, supra note 104, at 11-12 (providing a similar contextual example
concerning painting a house for different reasons).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 9-12.
231. Id. at 12. See generally JOHN RAWIS, COLLECTED PAPERS 473-96 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999) (discussing pluralism).
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er.232 Although I have raised the possibility of smaller litigation clusters-
polycentric litigation-briefly elsewhere and find it worth further consid-
eration,233 because polycentric litigation necessitates rethinking preclusion
doctrines and use of the All Writs Act, I focus here on ways to bring large
groups together.234 Otherwise, factional groups like the veterans' organiza-
tions in Agent Orange or country-specific Holocaust survivors may com-
pete with one another. Plus, the potential for "holdouts" to derail a fair
settlement persists when litigants feel that exit mechanisms best serve their
subgroup.
In contexts where litigants regard the aggregate principally as two or
more subgroups, they tend to promote their subgroup's interest over both
their private interest and the interests of those in the aggregate who are
nonsubgroup members.235 This kind of competition is common. Think of
departments competing for university resources or student organizations
competing for members and funding. Just as departments and students vie
to control common resources, subgroups within large-scale aggregation vie
for more compensation or to pursue different litigation goals. Thus, one
option is to encourage litigants to reconceptualize the aggregate as one su-
perordinate group.23 This makes litigants more concerned with the collec-
tive interest rather than their own individual interests or their relative sub-
group's interest.237
One way to achieve this goal transformation is to use a democratic-
style leader who acts as a mediator between competing plaintiffs' fac-
232. A substantial body of research from psychology and behavioral economics suggests that group
size substantially affects cooperation and other-regarding preferences: the larger the group, the less its
members cooperate. E.g., Dale 0. Stahl & Ernan Haruvy, Other-Regarding Preferences: Egalitarian
Warm Glow, Empathy, and Group Size, 61 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 20, 33 (2006).
233. Burch, supra note 11, at 55.
234. Note, however, that most empirical work demonstrates that larger groups tend to be less coop-
erative than smaller or midsized groups. See Ahn, Isaac & Salmon, supra note 64, at 190-91. As I
have noted, there is further need to consider when and how group sanctions should be imposed. Supra
note 225. Because sanctions are heavily tied into group size, I have opted to develop that aspect in
future work to keep the size of this Article manageable. For preliminary sources on this link, see
Marco Casari, On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments, 8 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 107 (2005);
Mizubo Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas, in NEW ISSUES
AND PARADIGMS IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS, supra note 16, at 93, 104-06; Toshio Yamagi-
shi, Group Size and the Provision of a Sanctioning System in a Social Dilemma, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS
AND COOPERATION, 311, 311-26 (U. Schulz, W. Albers & U. Mueller eds., 1994).
235. Wit & Kerr, supra note 55, at 617.
236. This assumes that reconceptualization is what we want to happen systemically, although rea-
sonable people could disagree on this point. If there is good reason for subgroup disputes (i.e., they
want to achieve fundamentally different goals), then we should consider maintaining smaller litigation
clusters, thereby allowing litigants to pursue alternative objectives. Granted, those objectives and the
results might conflict, and defendants could encounter problems with preclusion. But if permitting
litigants to pursue different goals is important enough (and I think it is, depending on the case), then we
ought to take on this evaluative task and determine whether smaller clusters are worthwhile.
237. Wit & Kerr, supra note 55, at 617-18. Granted, strong leadership that is not in favor of achiev-
ing overarching cooperation could be more polarizing. Thus, the leader in this situation should be more
akin to a mediator than someone who might advocate only for particular interests.
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tions.238 Viewing attorneys as facilitators and leaders in group litigation as
opposed to litigation architects might prove problematic given the conflicts
that frequently arise between attorneys and their clients. 239 Further, plain-
tiffs' lawyers might try to manipulate the structure and communication
within groups to best serve their own financial interests. Thus, one alterna-
tive is to use a "special officer" or outside mediator to advance discussion
and cooperation by making a collective membership category salient.24
Salient social categorization has the potential to change litigants' goals
by minimizing distinctions between subgroups and private interests and
giving greater weight to superordinate group membership and collective
outcomes. 241  For instance, subtly linking all litigants' fates could change
the litigation dynamic from competing subgroups-us versus them-to a
superordinate schema of being "in [it] together."24 2 Promoting overarching
similarities-salient social categorization-and thereby strengthening group
identity may also lead group members to expect others to act coopera-
tively. 243 Because cooperation is a dominant social norm, absent past inter-
actions to the contrary, members expect cooperation. 2" That expectation
then pressures individuals to reciprocate cooperative behaviors. Thus,
238. Empirical data demonstrates that group members facing a common resource dilemma, as op-
posed to a public good dilemma, are less reluctant to give up decisional freedom to a leader. Eric van
Dijk, Henk Wilke & Arjaan Wit, Preferences for Leadership in Social Dilemmas: Public Good Dilem-
mas Versus Common Resource Dilemmas, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 170, 175 (2003). As
noted in Part I, mass torts are more akin to common pool dilemmas. Moreover, litigation group mem-
bers are likely to be more receptive to democratic-style leader, where the leader involves members in
the decision-making process. See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilem-
mas: Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 482, 482-84 (1995); Mark Van Vugt et al., Autocratic Leadership in
Social Dilemmas: A Threat to Group Stability, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 2-3 (2004).
239. See supra Part I.
240. The ALI mentions use of a "special officer" in its draft. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.02 cmt. a, § 3.09 cmt. a (November 2008 draft). The meaning attributed to
"special officer" by the ALI is synonymous with my use of the term here. Other scholars have also
suggested the use of a mediator or special master for large-scale litigation. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 513 (1998);
Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995); Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama
DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 72 (1990); Francis E. McGovern, The What
and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1378 (2005); Stephen N. Subrin, A
Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196
(2003).
241. See David De Cremer & Mark Van Vugt, Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas: A
Transformation of Motives, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 886-90 (1999); Wit & Kerr, supra note
55, at 619.
242. See Gary Bornstein & Meyrav Ben-Yossef, Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Social
Dilemmas, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 52, 65 (1994); Wit & Kerr, supra note 55, at 632.
243. See David De Cremer & Eric van Dijk, Reactions to Group Success and Failure as a Function
of Identification Level: A Test of the Goal-Transformation Hypothesis in Social Dilemmas, 38 J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2002).
244. See Wit & Kerr, supra note 55, at 619.
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emphasizing the superordinate group's collective fate may increase plain-
tiffs' concern for other plaintiffs and increase individuals' willingness to
cooperate by enhancing their expectations that others will act similarly.
To implement this idea, special officers could promote cooperation
through intragroup discussion and deliberation. Deliberation could mitigate
mass tort dilemmas by: (1) providing claimants with information that is
frequently missing when deciding whether to settle-such as the strength of
their claim vis-A-vis that of others as well as information about other sub-
groups; and (2) increasing cooperation.245 The special officer could cata-
lyze the discussion and suggest particular strategies that chart a middle
course. Agreeing on litigation goals or at least jointly developing proce-
dures for collective decision-making could mitigate many of the intraclient
conflicts that plague aggregate litigation.
Discussion similarly facilitates opportunities for litigants to strengthen
their group cohesion, develop relationships with one another, and, accord-
ingly, to shift their concerns from their individual welfare to the group's
welfare. To put the matter concretely, if nightclub fire victims are trying to
design or modify a compensation grid, they might assign additional value
to particular claims after interacting with other group members; those suf-
fering from general emotional distress or minor physical injuries might
allocate additional compensation to those grieving the loss of their loved
one or suffering from severe disfiguration. Bringing litigants together in
this way humanizes the process by giving them an opportunity to meet each
other, as well as see and better understand other positions.
Granted, this method is particularly ripe for small-scale litigation.
Geographic dispersion in large-scale aggregation makes discussion and
group formation more difficult.246 Still, as the Merck Settlement Group
demonstrates, groups already form outside of territory-based communities
through the Internet even within litigation like Vioxx. So, while it may be
true that immediately masterminding one overarching group is implausible,
consensus building by emphasizing superordinate characteristics is not
completely unrealistic. Special officers might conduct regional discussions
245. Mediation has the potential to change group dynamics. See generally Kees van de Bos & E.
Allan Lind, The Psychology of Own Versus Others' Treatment: Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented
Effects on Perceptions of Procedural Justice, 27 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1324, 1331-33
(2001) ("Although it may be the case that we are sometimes insensitive to the injustices of others in
many real-world settings, the findings that are reported here show that that insensitivity is not insur-
mountable."); Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcomes: Measure-
ment Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REv. 419, 428 (1989). As but one example of using
mediation, consider Ken Feinberg and David I. Shapiro's role in shaping and negotiating the Agent
Orange Settlement in the face of fractured plaintiffs' organization. As a mediator who describes his
talent as getting "a diverse group of people to march in the same direction," Shapiro was perfectly
suited for his purpose of "get[ing] a deal done." SCHUCK, supra note 122, at 145-46.
246. Temporal dispersion is trickier than geographic distance, but is mitigated by nonclass aggrega-
tion's scope. By definition, nonclass aggregation binds only present litigants and not those that might
litigate in the future (as a class action does).
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or use technology, such as discussion boards and chat functions, to facili-
tate interaction.247
For instance, Ken Feinberg, who acted as the special master in the
September 11 Compensation Fund, conducted nearly endless town hall
meetings with claimants at schools, community centers, and hotels, provid-
ing them with an opportunity to tell their story and give their own account
of how that day changed their lives.248 Traveling across the country from
New York to California, he met with groups small and large ranging from
suburban widows, to six hundred Cantor Fitzgerald families, to families of
foreign workers, to firefighters.249 He credits this aspect of the process as
"the essential reason that the program was so successful."250 And the
nearly unprecedented 97% participation rate tends to reinforce this
claim.25'
This Part has raised and explored some of the psychological theories
that encourage cooperation among those within the group, including de-
signing just procedures, facilitating deliberation, reframing the divisive
issue, and eliciting promises. Claimants might implement these theories
themselves; more likely, however, an attorney or special officer could use
these techniques to reframe the alienating issue and promote discussion
among plaintiffs.252 Consequently, we should consider designing and insti-
tuting judicial procedures that promote group deliberation and decision-
making. Suffice it to say for now that methods exist for encouraging coop-
eration for sizeable litigation, but they necessitate far more consideration.
For now, the point is to emphasize the crucial importance of group dynam-
ics: determining what constitutes a litigation group and what obligations
follow from its membership can alleviate some of the challenges that non-
class aggregation presents.
247. Further research is needed on whether litigants require face-to-face interactions for cohesive
groups to form in litigation. For some initial research on Internet groups, see supra note 144 and ac-
companying text. Some studies have demonstrated other-regarding preferences even despite the "social
distance inherent [in] Internet interaction." Gary Charness, Ernan Haruvy & Doron Sonsino, Social
Distance and Reciprocity: An Internet Experiment, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 88, 88-90 (2007).
Absent conclusive evidence on that point, additional questions remain about the cost-effectiveness of
this proposal.
248. FEINBERG, supra note 102, at 47-55.
249. Id. at 55-57.
250. Kenneth R. Feinberg, How Can ADR Alleviate Long-Standing Social Problems?, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 785, 789 (2007); see also FEINBERG, supra note 102, at 164 ("I believe [the fund] can fairly
be considered the valedictorian of all compensation programs, public or private.").
251. FEINBERG, supra note 102, at 161.
252. Many of the ideas about groups and joint intent could equally apply to groups of plaintiffs
attorneys, who frequently litigate mass torts together. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 122-24 (1968); Rheingold,
supra note 18, at 1. The predominate problem in this grouping, however, is that while the attorneys
themselves might be unified, their clients might not be.
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CONCLUSION
Appreciating that plaintiffs often form social communities, and that
members within those communities might have moral obligations to one
another, adds a new dimension to the longstanding debates over judicial
handling of mass torts. This Article makes two important claims to address
dilemmas caused by nonclass aggregation. First, a group within aggregate
litigation is one in which litigants jointly and voluntarily commit to "X,"
where "X" might be anything from litigating together, to establishing cau-
sation, to having the product recalled, to recovering damages, to conduct-
ing discovery, to educating the public. Second, cultivating cooperation by
promoting discussion could catalyze group formation and deepen shared
commitments. Once litigants are committed to doing something together,
they might buttress that commitment by making mutual assurances and
promises to one another. Debating strategies about how to achieve "X" and
compromising could then lead to shared cooperative activity and group
policies. Fostering group deliberation and commitment similarly elicits and
forms social norms such as promise keeping, the desire for means-end
coherence, compatibility, and the tendency toward social agglomeration.
From these observations, four points follow. First, recasting mass-tort
litigation as claimant-centered rather than attorney-centered destabilizes
informational asymmetries that typically favor attorneys and disadvantage
plaintiffs. Members within a cohesive group are in a better position to
overcome these asymmetries, to negotiate with their attorneys, to monitor
the litigation, and to provide informed consent than those in a disaggre-
gated group. Second, instituting fair procedures for group deliberation,
collective decision-making, and allocation could provide participation op-
portunities that court-based litigation typically lacks. Empirical studies
demonstrate that people are more satisfied with their outcome if they par-
ticipated in the process or agreed ex ante on allocation procedures. Fair
procedures similarly promote cooperation by reaffirming members' social
status within the group. Third, one of the most robust findings in social
psychology is that when individuals see themselves as group members,
their concerns shift away from self-interested outcomes toward obtaining
equity for the collective group. This makes holdouts and opt outs less like-
ly. Finally, the promises elicited in the course of a shared endeavor like-
wise engender moral obligations not to opt out of that endeavor. Members
might then memorialize those obligations, policies, or decision-making
procedures in an intraclaimant governance agreement.
As always, the devil is in the details. This Article has concentrated on
communities and groups within aggregation as a source of obligation and
only briefly mentioned implementing the theory through attorneys or spe-
cial officers. The dirty work of justifying it, creating feasible procedures,
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actualizing cooperation, incentivizing both plaintiffs and their attorneys to
discuss dilemmas, designing and deciding on how and when to impose
sanctions, and determining when and how to account for exit contingencies
remains. And the current nature of mass torts, where attorneys act as ar-
chitects, designing and structuring lawsuits, is at odds with claimant-
centered litigation.
Although this shift from attorney-centered to claimant-centered and
from attorney-as-architect to attorney-as-facilitator is not meant to under-
mine the attorney's position as a private attorney general, it does change
the litigation equation in important ways. It suggests a proactive role that
empowers claimants by building consensus and establishing litigation goals
collaboratively. It similarly encourages attorneys to identify potential con-
flicts and group instability early in the litigation and, accordingly, to plan
exit contingencies when they cannot overcome group disunity or ethical
conflicts through framing, cooperation, and discussion. Though much re-
search remains, this Article enlists other disciplines to analyze the dilem-
mas embedded within mass torts and advance the debate beyond the con-
ventional camps of utilitarians and autonomy theorists. It promotes resolu-
tion of client-based conflicts by appreciating the importance of social
groups, understanding how they work, responding to their normative de-
mands, and harnessing their power to advance a cooperative alternative to
external coercion.
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